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INTRODUCTION
Investment is the vehicle of economic growth and growing importance of
capital flows, especially foreign direct investment, and its observable role in achieving
high growth rates in many countries give rise to examine the relationship between
capital flows and domestic investment. The class of models of investment in
developing countries extends the previous work in the theoretical literature on
investment in developed countries. However, applying these models to developing
countries has been difficult due to many market distortions, such as capital market
imperfection, economic and political uncertainty. Oil producing countries share most
of the common characteristics of developing counties. The tremendous political and
economic uncertainty in these countries create a “hit and run” or “wait and see”
attitude of the investors, which in turn delays investment, simply because there may be
a gain to be achieved by waiting in an uncertain environment and this implies a
reduction in aggregate investment. Also, the assumption of a perfect financial market
is far from justified due to information asymmetries and poorly financial market
infrastructure. In addition, most of capital flows to these countries, especially FDI, are
directed to oil investment. Both, this type of FDI and domestic investment in this
stage of development are always associated with high fixed cost, which makes most of
these investments irreversible. This specificity combined with uncertainty deters both
domestic investment and foreign investment.

1
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Though there are many studies examined the relationship between investment
and uncertainty, there is no theoretical or empirical study we aware of that considers
the specificity of oil producing countries in this relationship. In addition, there is no
single study that examines the dynamic interaction relationship between capital flows
and domestic investment under uncertainty and capital market imperfection. This study
endeavors to fill this gap with a new investment model specification considering the
characteristics of oil producing countries.
In the first chapter, we discuss and analyze the recent development in the
theory of investment under uncertainty, irreversibility, and capital market
imperfections. In the context of developing economies, we examined different
investment strategies under inflation and credit market imperfection. We discussed,
using the real option theory, how the uncertainty and irreversibility make investors
exercise the option to delay investment until they get more accurate information or
until the uncertainty is resolved and this would lead to a fall in aggregate investment.
The analysis of capital market imperfection with uncertainty has many implications.
First, uncertainty combined with the imperfection will result in underinvestment.
Second, uncertainty with the imperfection in credit market may cancel out the effect of
interest rare on investment. We may expect a decrease in investment at the same time
we see interest rate falling. Although these results are based on assumption that is
more realistic, uncertainty and imperfect markets, they may underpin the neoclassical
theory of investment in which financial factors are ignored. To test these results
empirically we will consider a proxy for credit market imperfection and uncertainty

2
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measures, inter alia, credit availability uncertainty in our investment model. In sum,
this chapter proposes the most important variables considered in the investment model
developed in the dissertation
In the second chapter, we distinguish between risk, volatility, and uncertainty.
We constructs uncertainty measures for macroeconomic variables which have been
chosen from the first chapter to estimate a model for how the uncertainty affects the
interaction between domestic investment and capital inflows in a sample of oil
producing countries and Middle East and North African countries (MENA). Through
this work we explore the sources and the importance of uncertainty in those countries
and then turn to discuss and examine empirically different approaches to measure
uncertainty. Specifically, we construct GARCH models to estimate inflation, exchange
rate, real interest rate, credit availability, and oil price uncertainty. In addition, we
investigate the impact of different shocks to oil price on the short run and long run oil
price uncertainty, the impact of Kuwait invasion in 1990, September 11, 2001, and
Iraqi war in 2003.
In the third chapter, we examine the interaction relationships between capital
flows and domestic investment under uncertainty and capital market imperfection in 12
oil producing countries from 1981 to 2003 periods. We pose two questions: (1) is
there a dynamic interaction between capital flows and domestic investment, in other
words, which one leads the other? (2) If there is, how is this interaction affected by
uncertainty and capital market imperfection considering the specificity of oil producing
countries? To address these questions, a four simultaneous equations model is

3
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developed to capture the dynamic interaction between capital inflows and domestic
investment. We employ Wooldridge’s (1996) Generalized Method of Moments-three
stage least square, (GMM- 3SLS) estimator, to estimate the simultaneous equations
using different instrumental variables for each equation in a dynamic panel framework.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold . Firstly, it combines the
issue of the behavioral characteristics of different types of capital flows raised in the
1970-1990 periods and the more recent issue of their impact on domestic investment
in the recipient countries. Secondly, the paper is different from previous empirical
studies in the following aspects: (1) it considers the impact of uncertainty on
investment, but distinguishes whether the uncertainty is persistent or not; (2) we
consider that the imperfection of financial markets in these countries may lead
investors to explore other channels to pass through capital inflows. So we focus on
specific potential sources of credit market uncertainty: real interest rate uncertainty
and uncertainty of credit availability; (3) we consider the possible different effect of
each type of capital inflows on domestic investment to see how important the capital
flows composition is. Thirdly, up to our knowledge, the subject of the study has been
never addressed using GMM-3SLS technique. This technique accounts for a potential
endogeneity of explanatory variables, controls for country-specific fixed effects, and
enables the use of different instruments for each equation in the model.
Our findings show that bi-direction interactions between domestic investment,
foreign investment, and foreign bank loans exist. However FDI induces domestic
investment more than domestic investment does. FBL is the second most important

4
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component in capital flows in stimulating domestic investment but its impact is much
less than FDI. Also we find that the negative effect of credit uncertainty on investment
dampens the positive effect of financial development and hence deter investment. The
policy implications drawn from this study are essential for macroeconomic policy
makers given that increasing capital mobility weakens the macroeconomic autonomy
via its potential effects on inflation, real exchange rate, and financial sector.
In the fourth chapter, we simulate the impacts of different policy responses on
capital flows and domestic investment to propose strategic policy initiatives. For doing
so, first: we discuss the macroeconomic problems, consequences, and policy issues
that the capital inflows cause. Second, we apply the model estimated in Chapter HI
with the out-of-sample forecasts to examine the effects of different policy scenarios on
the path of endogenous variable; domestic investment, FDI, FBL, and FPI to the
Egyptian economy over the 2004- 2010 horizon. The results are: (1) sterilization
policy is not recommended, (2) reducing short run and long run oil prices is favorable
and has positive effects on both domestic investment and capital inflows, (3) a
contractionary fiscal policy implemented by cutting government expenditure is more
effective than increasing taxes in response to the “overheating” caused by the capital
inflow, and (4) reducing uncertainty in all variables has a favorable effect in increasing
domestic investment and FDI.

5
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CHAPTER I
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT UNDER
UNCERTAINTY AND IMPERFECT CAPITAL MARKET
Investment is the vehicle of economic growth and the hope of future
prosperity. Previous studies have explored the determinants of economic growth and
the majority of these studies conclude that the most robust effect is the positive
relationship between investment and the growth rate of output (Levine and Renelt,
1992). Indeed, the new growth theory further emphasizes the role of investment in the
growth process (Romer 1986, 1987; Lucas, 1988). More specific, demand for
investment -with the supply of savings- determine how much of an economy’s output
is invested and how the standard of living behaves over the long run. In addition,
Changes in investment spending are the driving force behind the business cycle. They
played a powerful role in every single recession and boom.
The framework of studying investment in developing countries is an extension
of previous work in the theoretical literature on investment. Therefore, the studying of
well-defined class of models of accelerator, cash flows, new classical theory, Tobin’s q
...etc. forms the solid ground to develop investment models specified to developing
countries. However, applying these models to developing countries has been difficult
due to many markets distortions, such as credit market imperfection, and little reliable
data (Blejer and Khan 1984). In addition, these models do not consider the specific
characteristics of developing countries such as low saving rates, the need for foreign
finance, and political and economic uncertainty. The flow of bank credit and capital
6
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flows are the most important sources to expand financial saving and hence, increase
investment. The way of allocating these resources is also important. The assumption of
a perfect financial market is far from justified in developing countries due to
information asymmetries, and poorly financial market infrastructure. It has been known
that the absence of functioning financial market and uncertainty make investors less
eager to invest.
A relatively recent theoretical literature has focused on the role played by
uncertainty in shaping the investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). It is well
known that the combination of the typically irreversible nature of investment,
uncertainty about the future benefits and costs of the investment project, and some
flexibility about investment timing, may have a substantial impact on the investment
behavior. The uncertain macroeconomic environment in developing countries creates
a “hit and run” or “wait and see” attitude of the investors, which in turn delays
investment, simply because there may be a gain to be achieved by waiting in an
uncertain environment and this implies a reduction in aggregate investment.
The growing importance of capital flows; especially foreign direct investment,
and its observable role in achieving high growth rates in many developing countries
give rise to examine the relationship between capital flows and domestic investment.
Investment is the most effective channel through which capital flows affect growth. Of
course, much has been written about investment and many surveys and surveys of
surveys already exist. Instead of surveying, the goal of this chapter is to discuss the
relatively new theories in investment focusing on the effect of uncertainty and

7
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irreversibility on investment decision. What I plan to discuss and analyze is the
fundamental relationships between domestic investment and capital flows under
uncertainty. We use this analysis as a basis for developing an appropriate model of the
interaction between investment and capital flows in Chapter m .
The rest of the chapter is a follows, in section two we review the testable
hypotheses in investment theories. Section three discuses the modem theory of
investment under uncertainty and we focus on the real option theory. Section four
analyzes the role of credit and market imperfection and uncertainty in deterring
investment. Section five explores the interaction relationships between capital flows
and domestic investment. Section six sheds light on the role of government.
1- Investment Theories (Brief Survey)
1.1 The Accelerator Model
One of the earliest empirical models of aggregate investment behavior is the
accelerator model, which was put forward by J. M. Clark in 1917 as a possible reason
to rationalize the volatility of investment expenditures. The accelerator model is based
on the assumption of a fixed capital/output ratio. There are many well-known versions
of the accelerator model. The naive accelerator simply asserts that not only does the
optimal capital stock (K*t = aYt ) bear a fixed factor a (capital-output ratio) of
proportionality to output Yt, but also the capital stock is always optimally adjusted
instantaneously in each time period, implying that K*t= K» and therefore the net
investment is

S
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NIt =Kt -K t -l=cc(yt ~Yt -i)
This naive accelerator model has not fared well in empirical analysis, due in part to the
restrictive instantaneous adjustment assumption. It is also unable to account for the
serial correlation of investment beyond that of output growth. The flexible accelerator
model was introduced to overcome these problems. The adjustment of capital stock to
its optimal level is assumed to be a constant proportion $ of the gap between K* and
K. i.e. It= $ (Kt*-Kt.i). Since K*t = aYt then the flexible accelerator can be written
as:

Without details of derivations, we can identify many versions of the flexible accelerator
model. For example,
NIt = K t - K t - l = a[<P(Yt - Y t - \ ) + a ( l - ^ ( r t - \ - Y t - 2 ) + ^ - 4 ) 2( Y t - 2 - Y t -2 )+ -]

-O)

Equation (1) shows two things. First, the net investment (the change in capital stock)
depends on current and lagged changes in output. Second the effect of output changes
on investment is distributed over an infinite number of future time periods. Another
version of accelerator model is to add replacement investment to get gross investment
(<H).
GIt = <xtYt+(8-<t>)Kt-\

(2)

Where 8 is a constant and represents a depreciation rate. Avoiding the difficulties in
obtaining a reliable measure of capital stock, we can estimate the following equation.
GIt = a ^ Y t - ( X - ^ Y t - l + ( X - a ) G I t - l

(3)

9
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Equation (3) is called “Koyck transformation”. This equation can be estimated without
employing any capital stock data and 5 can be estimated instead of assuming it. The
main advantage of the accelerator model is its simplicity. It says that the investment is
a function only of current and lagged output and lagged capital stock. The economic
rational behind that is the current output is a signal to think about investment in the
current period and the lagged output terms represent the gradual response of
investment to changes in final demand including gestation lags. The lagged capital
stock, which bears the coefficient (5~4>), is the base for calculating replacement
investment and is to adjust the gap between desired and actual capital stock since the
capital output ratio is constant by assumption. The absence of prices, wages, and
taxes, (the cost of capital in particular) from the accelerator model has earned it
disrespect despite its empirical success.
1.2 The Neoclassical Model
This theory intended to remedy the absence of capital cost and the substitution
possibilities between capital and labor, which was ignored by assuming constant
capital, output ratio in accelerator model. Jorgenson (1963, 1971) started from the
optimization problem that relates the desired capital stock to interest rate, capital
prices, and tax policies. The pioneering studies by Jorgenson and his associates are
widely used until this day. Consider a model of a perfectly competitive firm facing no
adjustment costs, myopic expectations, and two inputs. Profits function can be written
as:
xt^PtYt~®tLt~ctKt
10
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Where P is the price of output (Y), eo is the wage rate. L is the hours of labor services;
c is the user cost of capital, and K is the quantity of capital services. In Jorgenson
specification, the firm chooses time paths of inputs and output to maximize the present
value of the profit subject to Cobb-Douglas production function. The durability of
capital goods involves uncertainties about lifetime of capital goods, future prices, of
inputs and output, and future output demands. Also, long-lived equipments means that
the firms might not be able to dispose of unwanted capital goods, this problem called
irreversibility of investment. Both problems make the present value optimization
problem very complex. To avoid this problem Jorgenson assumed the existence of a
perfect market for used capital goods. This means that the firm can sell its capital
goods at price equals to the present value of the expected service in the remaining
lifetimes.
Using the traditional Lagrangian multiplier and solving for the level of K* such
that the marginal physical product of capital equals the real user cost of capital,
Jorgenson obtained
K* =K

!ck

(4)

Where, P is the share of capital in Cobb-Douglas production function. Equation (4)
implies that K is decreasing in c. To apply this equation interest rate, capital
gains/losses, depreciation rate, and tax rate are included in the user cost of capital (c).
Specifying constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas production technology with some
mathematical manipulation, the net investment function can be written as:

11
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NIt=

ZPr f(PY/c )

.

J

7=0

Where ji is constant over time and j is the periods that the order (investment) takes to
be delivered. Equation (5) relates current net investment NIt to a distributed lag
function of current and previous investment, to current and previous changes in the
optimal capital stock, and finally to current lagged output and real user cost. Adding
the replacement investment SKt, we obtain the gross investment.
In sum, the neoclassical investment model is attractive on theoretical grounds
because it gives the optimal capital stock in a rigorous framework; it is the net present
value rule (NPV). The marginal approach suggests that firms keep on investing until
the value of an incremental value of the capitals equals to its cost, without regard to
what they expect future marginal revenue products or user costs to be (Bemdt, 1996).
However, the foundations of neoclassical investment model have been criticized on the
grounds that: the assumptions of perfect competition, zero adjustment cost, and
exogenously given output are inconsistent; the assumption of static expectations about
future prices, output, and interest rates is inappropriate, since investment is essentially
forward-looking. In addition, the neoclassical model is for optimal capital stock not
optimal investment so the choice of the lags (in decision making and delivery) are
introduced ad hoc rather than based on optimization theory. Finally, by assuming the
existence of perfect competitive secondhand market for used capital goods, the model
considered that all investment is reversible which is not realistic.

12

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

1.3 Tobin’s q Model
In practice expectation about demand and costs are central to investment
decisions. Firms expand when they expect their sales to be growing and their cost to
be low and vice versa. Thus it is costly for a firm to increase or decrease its capital
stock. This adjustment cost was assumed to equal zero in neoclassical model. Tobin
(1969) introduced a model of investment with adjustment cost, known as q theory of
investment. Under price-taking setting and constant returns to scale production
function, the firm’s real profits are proportional to firm’s capital stock (k) and
decreasing in the industry-wide capital stock (K). We assume that the real interest rate
(r) is constant; the purchase price of capital is constant and equal 1 so that the firm has
only internal adjustment costs, and no depreciation. The key assumption of the model
is that the adjustment costs are a convex function of the rate of change of the firm’s
capital stock. Tins assumption implies that the marginal adjustment cost is increasing
in the size of the adjustment.
In a discrete-time version, the firm maximizes the present value of profits
x(Kt)kt -it-C (jt) subject to kt+i = k* +It. where I is the firm’s investment, C(I) is the
adjustment cost. For brevity, we will not carry out the mathematical derivations, which
can be found in any textbook, see for example (Romer, 2001). Instead, we will focus
on the intuition and implications. The first order condition of the profits maximizing
problem in period t is given by equation (6).
qf ^l + cilt)

(6)

13
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Where qt = (l+r/X* shows the value to the firm as a result of an additional unit of
capital at time t+1 in time-t value and h is the Lagrange multiplier. Equation (6)
simply shows that the firm invests to the point where the cost of acquiring capital
(purchase price plus marginal cost of adjustment) equals the value of the capital. The
idea is that an increase in capital by one unit will increase the present value of the firm
by q. Hence, q is the market value of a unit of capital. If the ownership is traded in the
stock market, q will distinguish any firm with one more unit of capital from the other.
Since the purchase price (replacement cost) is fixed at 1, then q is the ratio of market
value of a unit of capital to its replacement cost.. However, if the investment
ownership is not traded in the stock market, we can compute the value as an expected
increase in the present value of profits as a result of installing an additional unit of
capital and its replacement cost.
All information about the future that is relevant to the firm’s investment
decision with adjustment costs is summarized in q. The uncertainty about future price,
demand, costs, taxes, and other factors affecting future profitability are explicitly
included in the investment decision. When the increase in the firm’s market value
exceeds (or less than) the replacement cost, firms will desire to increase (or decrease)
their capital stock. The investment decision is made when q is equal or greater than 1.
The investment is an increasing function of marginal q in the presence of convex
adjustment costs.
However, it is not easy to measure marginal q. Hayashi (1982) proved that,
under perfect competition and constant returns to scale marginal q is equal to average

14
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q, which is the ratio of the market value of the entire existing capital stock to its
replacement cost. He point also to the problems in using average q. If firms enjoy
economies of scale or market power, or if they cannot sell all they want, marginal q
will be different from average q. Moreover, the assumption of increasing marginal
installation costs underlying the q theory is dubious. The cost of additions to an
individual firm’s capital stock is likely to be proportional or even less proportional to
the volume of investment because of the lumpy nature of many investment projects.
More important, disinvestment, if feasible, is more costly than positive investment
because capital goods often are firm specific and have a low resale value.
In contrast to these complicated theoretical studies, large number of recent
empirical researches report that investment is not obviously related to q as expected.
The recent literature has involved in solving this ambiguous relationship by focusing
on three issues: uncertainty, irreversibility, and the option to wait and delay
investment.
2-

Modem Theory of Investment Under Uncertainty

The modem theory of investment under uncertainty is based on the interaction
among three characteristics of investment, which were ignored totally or partially in
previous theories. These three characteristics are uncertainty, irreversibility, and “wait
and see” attitude in making investment decisions. The new literature, known as the
real option theory of investment, is led by (McDonald and Siegel, 1986; Ingersol and
Ross, 1992; Pindyck, 1993; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Although most of this literature
focuses on models of firm behavior, there are many implications for aggregate
15
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investment. In this section, I will explain the importance of uncertainty in investment
decision, how previous theories addressed it, the real option theory and its new
implications for investment decision, and finally the relationship between investment
and different sources of uncertainty.
2.1 The Importance of Uncertainty to Investment
Investors necessarily look into the future before undertaking any investments.
Therefore, investment behavior will be responsive to the degree of investor uncertainty
about future prices, rates of return, and economic conditions. Indeed, Keynes (1936)
was the first who pointed out that the animal spirits of private investors would be the
main driving force in investment volatility since any rational assessment of the return
on investment was bounded to be uncertain. In the early investment models,
accelerator models and adjustment costs hereafter, the role of uncertainty—embodied
in the backward looking expectations formation—was implicitly introduced through
the inclusion of lagged variables. These attempts to capture the uncertainty effect had
been criticized according to its ad hoc approach. The neoclassical theory did not pay
much attention to the roles of expectations and uncertainty; it just assumed static
expectation about future prices. Indeed, while the neoclassical model considered static
expectations about future, the role of future expectations was made explicit in qmodels of investment (Tobin, 1969) when agents’ expectations about future conditions
are included in the corporate stock valuation.
Before analyzing the effects of real option theory and its application to the
relationship between investment and uncertainty, it is worth citing the theoretical
16
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directional relationship between investment and uncertainty. Nickell (1978) noted that
uncertainty reduces investment in the presence of adjustment costs, or in Tobin’s q.
However, Hartman (1972) and Abel and Eberly (1995) explained that increased
uncertainty might raise investment because it can raise the marginal profitability of
capital, and hence increase investment. In the theory, the two different expected signs
of the relationship between investment and uncertainty depend on the shape of the
marginal revenue product of capital (MRPk) as a function of the shock. The shock here
is any change in mean preserving in the variance of an uncertain variable of interest. If
the function is convex, then a mean-preserving increase in the variance of an uncertain
variable will increase investment and the opposite for concave function. The flexibility
of labor-capital ratio is the important assumption made to produce convex function in
Abel (1983), and hence positive relation between uncertainty and investment. For
example, assume a firm with a fixed labor-capital ratio faces a price shock. The MRPk
function will be linear because the firm cannot adjust to such a shock. On the other
hand, if labor can be adjusted, then the change in MRPk will be more than the change
in price i.e,, convex MRPk (Leahy and Whited 1996).
Models that predict concave MRPk function are the class of models with
irreversible investment. Partially or totally irreversibilities generate asymmetry in
investment return. When the outlook is worse than expected, MRPkfalls and the
investors will be locked in with low return. In contrast, if the outlooks improve and
there is incentive to invest more, the rise in MRPk will be limited. This asymmetry or
hysteresis generates concave MRPk function. Therefore, greater uncertainty makes
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investment undesirable. Irreversibility means that the sunk cost involved in investment
expenditures cannot be recovered because it is a firm or an industry specific.
Irreversibility may also arise because of the absence of well functioning secondary
market for capital in most countries.
There are economic rationales behind translating uncertainty on the firm level
into aggregate level. It has been discussed that if firm or industry fluctuations in
uncertainty are not coincident, then these fluctuations will simply cancel each other out
at the aggregate level. However, Bemanke (1983) discusses two possible reasons why
the effects of uncertainty may not average out at the aggregate level. Firstly,
macroeconomic factors, such as uncertainty about future interest, exchange and
inflation rates or shocks in fiscal or monetary policy, affect on the micro level decision
making. Secondly, aggregate uncertainty may be generated or propagated by
individual decision makers. If an individual firm is uncertain about whether an
aggregate demand shock is transitory or permanent, then the decision to invest may be
delayed in order to learn about its degree of permanence. Bemanke (1983) argues that
the irreversibility of investment is one of such propagating mechanism. Similarly, if
firms are uncertain about the impact of an aggregate demand shock on their individual
demand levels, they may delay decisions (Carruth et al, 2000).
Bertola and Caballero (1994) investigate the properties of aggregate
investment under irreversibility. They argue that microeconomic irreversibilities in the
presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty are also relevant to aggregate investment
dynamics. Their theoretical analysis demonstrates that, in complete reversibility and
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uncertainty, the rate of investment for a revenue-maximizing firm at any point in time
will depend on the capital stock and the user cost of capital, augmented by terms to
capture the stochastic effects of uncertainty on revenue. They construct a hypothetical
desired aggregate investment-capital stock ratio under the assumption of reversible
investment and compare this to the observed investment ratio using the following
relationship:
(A In

yt

- A In

(7)

ct)~

where (_L) and (Z.) are the reversible and actual investment rates respectively, 7 is
Kx ' t

K T

revenue (proportional to GNP), c is a neoclassical user cost of capital series, 8 is the
depreciation rate and 4 is a parameter capturing the elasticity of output with respect to
capital. Bertola and Caballero show that for reasonable values of a and o, the
calculated rate of reversible investment displays much greater cyclical volatility than
does the actual series. Moreover, the actual series displays much greater first order
serial correlation than the reversible investment series.
Evidence for the aggregate investment-uncertainty relationship has been found
using a variety of empirical approaches, and the broad conclusion is that the negative
“option” effect outweighs the positive “Hartman-Abel” effect of uncertainty on the
marginal value of capital. The results of the various aggregate empirical studies that
attempt to correlate investment with alternative methods for proxying uncertainty
show that the relationship is negative. By contrast, the results of the smaller number of
disaggregated studies are far less conclusive (Carruth et. al, 2000).
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2.2 Real Option Theory and Investment Under Uncertainty
The new theories of investment start from the observation of that the NPV
rule, which is the basis in the neoclassical model, ignores three important issues in
investment decision, which are irreversibility, uncertainty and the possibility to delay
investment (option to wait). The possibility to delay means that the investment
decision is no longer “now-or-never” decision as assumed is neoclassical model.
Waiting for more accurate information or solving the uncertainty surrounding the
investment decision is valuable and its value should be compared with the opportunity
cost of not to invest now. The option to delay irreversible investment can alter the
decision to invest. In this case, the NPV is not applicable. Moreover, it undermines the
theoretical foundation of neoclassical investment model (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). In
brief, projects that have negative NPVs may have positive NPVs once the value
options purchased are included. The new theory of investment has been developed on
the idea of that, an investment today buys options to invest later, and the analysis of
such an investment must account for the value of these options. In addition, an optiondriven strategy assumes that an investment today may derive its value from the future
choices it makes possible (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1985).
The book of Dixit and Pindyck (1994) on the effect of uncertainty provides a
valuable survey of advances in this literature. They presented an option-based model of
irreversible investment in conditions of uncertainty. In their model, the ability to delay
an irreversible investment decision is similar to a financial call option. The possibility
of postponing an investment has a cost as well as a benefit. The benefits resulting from
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the arrival of new information might outweigh the cost under conditions of
uncertainty. By waiting, the firm incurs a loss in the expected profits; however, new
information under uncertainty is so valuable that it might lead to higher profits in the
future. This suggests a critical threshold above which investment is undertaken. That
is, investment takes place at the point where net present value of the investment
project is positive such that it is greater than the value of postponing the project to the
investor.
To explain how irreversibility and uncertainty affect the investment, consider
the following example. Assume a monopolist who faces sunk cost (I) to start a project
whose present value is V. under the NPV rule, if V-I > o, the investor will go ahead
and invest. Now if V is variable over time and evolves according to geometric
Brownian motion:

dV=aVdt+ aVdz

( 8)

Where dz is the increment of a Wiener process, a is the mean of dV and a is the
standard deviation ofdV. Equation (8) implies that the current value of the project is
known but the future value is lognormally distributed with expected value E (V,) =Vt=0
exp (at) and a variance growing linearly with the time horizon t. Since V evolves
when information arrives, the future value of the investment is always uncertain. The
firm will maximize the expected present value of the investment opportunity, given by
F (V) = max E [(VrI) exp (-pT)]. The solution to this problem is given by equation
(9).
(9)
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Equation (9) defines the wedge ft/(fl-1) between the payoff needed to induce the
investor to exercise the option to invest V and the present value of the cost of the
investment I. given that ft>l, the wedge is always greater than 1, and hence V >1.
The size of the wedge is positively related to uncertainty about future returns a,
discount rate p, and the drift term in the evolution process of the expected rate of
return a. The wedge converges to unity when ft increases and in this case NPV and
real option rules coincide.
According to the preceding analysis, the higher the level of uncertainty and the
greater the irreversibility investment, the greater the opportunity cost of undertaking
the investment in the current time. Investors will require a higher rate of return in
order to compensate for the opportunity cost of exercising the option to invest rather
than waiting. When the rate of returns are constrained by the availability of investment
opportunities, the productive capacity of these investments, and the efficiency in
allocating resources, then under the conditions of real option theory investors will
choose the option to delay investment and this would lead to a fall in aggregate
investment. The model of irreversible investment under uncertainty identifies the
conditions under which the investment should be undertaken, rather than giving a
structural model of investment. However, the predictions of this approach are quite
clear in the sense that uncertainty plays an important role in determining private
investment although the analytical studies present different results on the sign of the
effect of uncertainty (Serven, 1998).
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2.3 Inflation. Inflation Uncertainty, and Investment

Intuitively, inflation uncertainty is the degree to which the future inflation rate
is unknown in the sense of not being predictable, given past performance (Golob
1993). Similarly, long-run price-level uncertainty is the extent to which the longerterm path of the price level is unpredictable. Since these concepts seemed to be closely
linked, however they are still distinct. Then, a high level of long-term inflation
uncertainty would still imply a high level of price-level uncertainty. The connection
between inflation uncertainty and investment can be through uncertainty about real
wages, output price, and /or real profit.
A typical mechanism through which inflation uncertainty affects business
investment is through the discount rate that is used to calculate the expected net
present value, that is, its effect on the cost of capital. Increased uncertainty clearly
raises the cost of capital through its effect on the discount rate used to calculate the
expected net present value. If the firm cannot diversify the uncertainty about real
future payoffs, increased uncertainty will deter a firm from undertaking capital
expenditure (Huizinga, 1993). The mechanisms through which changes in inflation
uncertainty may affect longer-term real economic performance can also be found in the
recent theoretical literature on investment and irreversibility. The implications of the
assumption of irreversibility for investment decision-making are likely to be even more
important in situations of high levels of aggregate- or industry-wide uncertainty (non
diversified uncertainty).
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In contrast, the theoretical work by Abel (1983) shows that the benefits of
having a high capital stock when the price-cost-ratio is high outweigh the costs of
having a high capital stock when price-ratio is low. This suggests that increased
uncertainty about a firm’s ratio of output price to variable cost should increase capital
stock. However, in the context of real option theory, when the firm decides to invest,
it ignores an option and this option becomes more valuable with higher inflation
uncertainty leading new firms to be reluctant to invest, given the assumption of
irreversibility. For a new firm, higher uncertainty would lower the optimal capital
stock.
As well, if the economic environment in the future is perceived to be more
uncertain than at present, then the required level of profitability on new investment
projects will rise, leading to a clear reduction in investment (Caballero et al 1997).
Moreover, the objective of the promotion of aggregate capital spending is likely to be
better achieved by stable and credible macroeconomic policies than by frequent
changes in tax rates or interest rates (Pindyck 1991). In particular, a significant
increase in uncertainty regarding future economic policies would likely raise the value
to many firms of waiting for more information, and lead them to reduce investment
expenditures substantially, at least in the short run. The analysis of economic behavior
in models with incomplete market implies that an increase in uncertainty regarding
future incomes, part of which might reflect higher long-run inflation uncertainty,
would lead households to reduce current consumption, while firms would postpone
selected irreversible investment projects (Dreze 1999).
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In financial investment, if there is a substantial rise in uncertainty regarding the
future path of aggregate prices, then it becomes much riskier for agents to hold un
indexed longer-term nominal assets. The recent theoretical literature focusing on
asymmetric information in credit market shows how higher rates of inflation can impair
the effective functioning of the financial market. An increase in the rate of inflation
lowers the real rate of return on all financial assets, thereby increasing the level of
frictions in credit markets and consequently reducing investment spending (Huybens
and Smith 1999). In addition, it seems likely that financial markets would perform less
effectively if inflation and long-run inflation uncertainty rose. The various effects on
financial markets arising from greater long-term inflation uncertainty have adverse
effects on investment and economic growth.
Focusing on the source of uncertainty, short versus long run effect, Chadha
and Samo (2002) found evidence of a clear link between uncertainty in the price level
and investment. Moreover, they found that short-run uncertainty is more important in
determining real activity than long-run uncertainty. Ball and Cecchetti (1990) when
considering the impact of uncertainty in inflation on the level of inflation itself also
raised this point.
2.4 Exchange Rate. Exchange Rate Uncertainty, and Investment
Exchange rate changes and uncertainty surrounding it affect domestic
investment through three forces: (I) Sectoral profitability effect, (II) Location Effect,
and (HI) portfolio and Wealth effect (Goldberg 1990). Sectoral profitability is affected
by both Exchange rate changes and exchange rate uncertainty. Depreciation
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(appreciation) changes relative-price, which increase (decrease) demands for exports
and import-competing goods. Increased (decreased) profitability of domestic
producers caused by depreciation (appreciation) would lead firms to expand (contract)
investment in capacity and new plant and equipment. In addition, the real incomereducing (increasing) effect of depreciation (appreciation) may lead to a contraction
(expansion) in domestic demand, which exceed corresponding increases (decreases) in
foreign demand for domestic goods. Furthermore, in the absence of domestic
substitutes for imported intermediate inputs, the depreciation (appreciation) increase
(decrease) the marginal costs of production and hence appears to be negative/positive
supply shock. The net effects of the exchange rate changes on foreign demand for
domestic goods have determinate effect on prices but not quantity. This suggests that
the expected effect of exchange rates on investment is ambiguous.
On the other hand, exchange rate uncertainty affects the sectoral profitability
via its impact on expected costs of production and revenues from international sales.
The sign of this relationship depends on the balance of three factors: (1) the negative
effects from risk aversion of investors, (2) the negative effects of investment
irreversibilities, (3) the positive effects from convexity in prices, and (4) the negative
effects from a profit and price uncertainty relationship that is possible under imperfect
competition (Goldberg 1993).
The “location effect” refers to the entry and exit of firms from the market in
response to exchange rate changes and exchange rate uncertainty (Goldberg 1990).
These effects depend on the barriers to entry, the sunk cost of exiting. The location
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channel for the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on investment depends on the
exposure of both domestic and foreign producers to foreign exchange rate changes.
High exchange rate uncertainty causes more reluctance to enter or exit industries.
Thus, the elasticity of investment to exchange rate changes will be affected in high
uncertainty periods. The “portfolio and wealth effect” of exchange rate changes refers
to the redistribution of wealth across international investors via risk aversion and home
assets preferences. For example, if the dollar depreciates against the euro, the
Europeans gain wealth relative to Americans. This redistribution of wealth may shift
aggregate portfolio and direct investment demands. Nevertheless, if the Europeans
have strong home assets preferences, the wealth distribution may reduce overall
investment in the U.S.
Based on these results we can say the sign of the impact of exchange rate
uncertainty on investment is an empirical matter. In developing countries, the view
may be different. The substitutability between traded and non-traded goods is very
weak or may not exist because the traded good sectors in most of developing
countries are exporting primary goods, raw material and oil. In addition, these
countries do not have a well-diversified manufacturing base. Therefore, if demand for
traded goods rises due to depreciation, resources may not be reallocated toward this
sector and away from the production of non-traded goods. Another contractionary
effect of exchange rate depreciation originates on the supply side. The increased
demand for factor inputs by tradables sector raises the cost of nontradables.
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Furthermore, the cost of intermediate goods required in producing non-traded goods
will increase due to depreciation.
Under exchange rate changes, uncertain economic environment and costly
reallocation of resources across sectors, we expect that the response of resource
transfer and investment to exchange rate changes is weak. Foreign direct investment is
operating indifferent currency units, therefore the firms’ profit and firms’ decisions as
where to produce may be affected by exchange rate movements and exchange rate
uncertainty. So exchange rate uncertainty not only can create a problem of managing
the risk inherent in its volatility but also present the opportunity of moving production
to lower cost facilities. Sung and Lapan (2000) and Goldberg and Kolstad (1995)
studied the effect of exchange rate risk on FDI. Their model assumes constant
marginal cost and the production decisions are made before resolving the uncertainty.
They showed that increased exchange rate uncertainty led a risk-averse firm to alter its
FDI in order to reduce risk. On the other hand, some empirical studies show that
positive and significant correlation between increases in exchange rate risk and FDI
flows (Cushman 1985).
In Developing Countries, Serven (2003) found that real exchange rate
uncertainty has a highly significant impact on investment. The impact was larger at
higher levels of uncertainty. Moreover, the investment effect of real exchange rate
uncertainty was shaped by the degree of trade openness and financial development:
higher openness and weaker financial systems are associated with a more significantly
negative uncertainty- investment link. Recent studies on exchange rate uncertainty and
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investment such as Nucci and Pozzolo (2001) and Baum et al. (2001) have extended
looking for the source of uncertainty. These studies reported that permanent changes
in the exchange rate are important for the level of investment whilst changes in the
transitory component are not.
2.5 Credit Availability. Credit Uncertainty, and Investment
The neoclassical model of investment predicts that investment is negatively
related to the cost of capital. Empirically, this prediction has not been fully supported
in both developing and industrial countries (Chirinko, 1993). The analytical and
empirical studies of developing countries in particular have attributed this result to the
institutional and structural characteristics of these countries. Private investment in
developing countries is constrained mainly by the availability of external funds rather
than the cost. Credit constraint is likely to be more important partly because the
relative scarcity of financial resources in developing countries. Moreover, controls
over interest rates and credit rationing in the financial markets in most developing
countries highlight the importance of credit availability and reduce the role of the cost
of capital (proxied by the interest rate). Adding the credit availability to the model
instead of the cost of capital, empirical studies found that the availability of credits to
private sector positively affects private investment (Blejer and Khan, 1984 for a panel
o f developing countries and Ramirez, 1994 for Mexico). Therefore, they suggested
that credit availability exerts a binding constraint on private investment that makes the

cost of financing less important in explaining private investment in developing
countries (Erden, 2000). There is, however, another theoretical explanation provided
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in the literature of irreversibility approach to modeling investment behavior. Pindyck,
1991; Caballero, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Abel and Eberly, 1994, 1995 argued
that uncertainty surrounding the costs of credit may have a more substantial impact on
private investment than the level of costs.
Accordingly, there may be another reason why the cost of capital (often
proxied by real interest rate) does not show up as a statistically significant determinant
of private investment. For example, private firms/investors may not respond to the
changes in real interest rate because of uncertainty surrounding the real cost of capital.
Given the preceding discussion, we will investigate the effect of credit availability and
credit uncertainty on investment in our model
3-

Investment and Credit Market Imperfection

There is a huge literature about the role of capital market imperfection in
investment decisions. Surveying this literature is beyond this chapter (Fazzari et al
1988). However, I will explain the idea and relate it to uncertainty. The basic idea
about the role of capital market imperfection and investment is that Firms usually
choose between “internal funds” (retained profits, cash flows, etc...) or “external
funds” (borrowing from financial institutions such as banks) to finance their
investments. Under complete markets, the firm should be indifferent to choose one of
these sources. However, under imperfect capital market, due to asymmetric
information, external funds may not be available or available at a prohibitive price.
Since internal funds are partially exhausted and external funds are costly, firms in this
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situation are called financially constrained firms because they are presumed to
underinvest and cannot take advantage of their investment opportunities.
The problem of imperfect capital markets has macro-aspects and micro
aspects. Frictions arising from capital market imperfection affect the expected future
profitability and user costs of capital and can play a major role in propagating
relatively small shocks. Macroeconomists noticed that cyclical movements in
investment could be largely explained by financial factors; therefore, they identified
them in investment models. In this context, the term “financial accelerator” has been
used to refer to the magnification of initial shocks by capital market imperfections
(Bemanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1994).
The gap between the cost of internal and external funds is explained by
asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders. The micro-aspects of capital
market imperfection explain the reasons and impacts of such asymmetric information
on credit markets. Imperfect information produces adverse selection and moral hazard
problem, which in turn generate frictions in capital markets. Adverse selection in credit
market means that the market of bad quality borrowers (or more risky) drives out the
good ones. A higher return is required to compensate external providers of funds for
monitoring and screening cost and the potential moral hazards associated with
managers’ control over the allocation of investment funds. These problems drive the
gap between the cost of external fund (including “Lemons” premium) and internal
funds.
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We can modify the graphical illustration given in (Hubbard 1994, 1998) to
simplify the discussion about the effects of asymmetric information in credit market on
investment and to consider the effect of uncertainty. In his paper, Hubbard assumed
the following in figure (1-1): (D) is the firms’ demand for capital. Its location is
determined by factors affect the firm’s investment opportunities. (S) is the supply
curve of funds; it consists of two parts. The first is the horizontal line at real interest
rate (r*) up to the level of funds that the investor has (Wo) i.e. initial internal fund. In
this range, there are no agency costs and the external funds providers (lenders) charge
rate of return equal the real interest rate as assumed in neoclassical investment model.
The second part is upward sloping to reflect the increasing information costs needed to
compensate the risk of opportunistic behavior of the borrower as he/she engaged in
uncollateralized loans. Of course, an increase in the internal funds (Wi), will shift the
curve to right because the increase in W will reduce the borrower’s incentive to
misallocate funds reducing the informational cost and subsequently the cost of
borrowing decreases. Finally, the positive slope portion of S curve will be steeper as
marginal cost of information increases and vice versa. Under frictionless setting (no
information cost), K* is the best capital stock where investors are indifferent to finance
their investment by internal or external funds. Now in the presence of imperfection
(positive friction i.e. information cost), the actual level of capital stock Ko be
determined by the intersection of D1 and S (Wo). This level is under the best level.
That is, there is underinvestment due to capital market imperfection.
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Now let us discuss the effects of Introducing uncertainty in the presence of
capital market imperfection. First, the S (W0) curve will be steeper as the cost of
information gets higher. This effect by itself will reduce investment to K i. If we
assume that the investment opportunities will decrease under uncertainty, then the Di
curve will shift left causing further decrease in investment. This discussion has two
important implications. First, uncertainty combined with the imperfection will result in
underinvestment. Second, uncertainty with the imperfection in credit market may
cancel out the effect of interest rare on investment. We may expect a decrease in
investment at the same time we see interest rate falling. Although these results are
based on assumption that is more realistic, uncertainty and imperfect markets, they
may underpin the neoclassical theory of investment in which financial factors are
ignored. To test these results empirically we will consider a proxy for credit market
imperfection (credit flow/GDP ratio) and uncertainty measures, inter alia, credit
availability uncertainty in our investment model.
Finally, having the complementarities between capital inflows and domestic
credit, then the surge in capital flows would increase credit as follows: capital flows
will Increase the asset prices (land, real state) and in imperfect credit market, debt
capacity is limited and then agents are credit-constrained within the value of collateral
holdings. This value will increase due to the increase in asset prices. The increase of
collateral holdings will increase the debt capacity of credit-constrained agents, which
subsequently increases credit. The adverse shock to international capital market will
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cause persistent contractionary effect in the presence of credit market imperfection.
(Kubo, 2002)
4-

Capital Flows and Domestic Investment

In the theory, the reallocation of capital from industrial countries to developing
countries, where the marginal productivity of capital is relatively high, can improve
living standards by mobilizing global saving to finance investment opportunities in
developing countries. It has been observed that private capital flows have been
associated with a rise in domestic investment in developing countries. However, it is
not clear whether the capital flows has a direct effect on domestic investment or
indirect effect by just financing the investment that would have occurred in any event
(World Bank, 2001). The relationship between capital flows, especially FDI, and
growth has been widely discussed in economic literature, but the precise nature of the
relationship and the mechanism through which it promotes growth remain unexplored.
I shall focus first on the impact of foreign investment on economic performance via
domestic investment, and then I will discuss the determinants of FDI and the role of
capital flows in economic growth.
Theoretically, at least FDI may affect private and public investment in the host
country through two distinct channels. First, FDI can raise the profitability of domestic
investment by involving in providing infrastructure, supplying scarce inputs, creating
demand for local inputs and labor, spreading positive externalities, and increasing tax
revenue that may be used in public goods. On the other hand, FDI may reduce
profitability of domestic investment by possessing large market share, worsening terms
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of trade, stifling domestic competition, and spreading negative externalities if it is
tariff-jumping FDI type. Second, FDI could increase domestic investment by providing
facilities, to acquire and merge with domestic firms, such as additional funding and
efficient marketing network. When FDI firm owns domestic investment in the process
of privatization, the total investment will not change but the ownership structure will
change. The change in ownership structure of total investment will have a negative
effect on domestically financed investments, given the financial market constraints
(McMillan, 2001).
Now we turn to discuss how domestic investment stimulates capital flows. The
country’s absorptive capacity plays a major role in magnifying the positive effect of
capital flows on domestic investment. It includes not just the macroeconomic policy
framework but also political stability, the depth of financial system, the well-educated
labor force, the quality of infrastructure, and the degree of corruption. More
specifically, Capital flows are more strongly associated with domestic investment in
countries where financial markets are deeper. Diamond (1984) shows that specializing
in financial services will reduce the costs of acquiring information and diversify risks
by pooling the funds of depositor, hence increase liquidity and facilitate investment in
the long run. Moreover, financial sector development is significantly associated with
faster growth (Beck et al 2000). It has been discussed that foreign capital often brings
new financial instruments, accounting and financial disclosure practices. These benefits
enhance the standard of local capital markets by acquiring more quality of information
and transparency. Capital flows and financial development can reinforce each other.
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Portfolio flows and bank lending can increase financial sector development, and hence
increase the efficiency of capital allocation (Hechet et al 2002). However, an inflow of
capital does not guarantee improvement in financial sector especially when capital
flows are volatile.
Besides, the importance of domestic conditions’ role in attracting capital flows,
domestic conditions affect the composition of capital flows. Razin et al. (1998) explain
that the information asymmetry problem affects on the composition of capital flows to
developing countries. They suggest that FDI is the most preferred type of capital flows
because it overcomes the informational barriers. The next in the ranking is the debt
flows, FBL while the equity (FPI) will be issued as a last resort when information
asymmetries are the least. Hull and Tesar (2000), show that, for small countries that
integrate into the global capital markets with firms that have relatively high risk and
lower credit rating, international capital flows will be dominated by FDI and FPI as
opposed to FBL.
Dunning (1988) put forward general framework in which we can determine the
variables likely to affect on FDI activity. This framework consists of three potential
advantages for FDI in a foreign country: ownership, location and internalization (OLI).
First, ownership advantages (firm specific advantage) include any monopoly power
that the MNC may practice and allows it to overcome the costs of operating in a
foreign country, for example, proprietary technological know-how, R&D capacity,
trademarks and known brand names, and workers and managers with industry specific
human capital. The firm specific advantages such as product differentiation or
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economies of scale serve as entry barriers at home and as a way to subdue the
obstacles of competing in foreign markets, hence, make the FDI a preferable mode of
entry. Second, internalization advantages achieved via coordinating production
hierarchies versus markets, increase efficiency and reduce costs of transactions. These
advantages enable large firms to accomplish goals more cheaply within the single firm
than can be accomplished in a market setting among separate corporations. If there is
no market or the market functions poorly, transaction costs can be kept in check by
internalization. For example, internal economies of production, advantage of intra-firm
trade, economies of scale in overhead operations (marketing, finance, purchasing).
These advantages make the firm’s choice is to own the foreign assets directly rather
than to use other mode to obtain the rents from foreign production. Third, location
advantages (country specific advantage) which are factors that favor production either
at home or abroad. For example, prices of internationally immobile inputs, differences
in quality of infrastructure (public; educational; commercial and legal), transportation
costs, economies of marketing when production is located near the market (Gray,
1999).
The OLI framework suggests that countries tend to go through five main
stages of development and these stages can be classified according to the propensity of
those countries to be outward and/or inward direct investors. In turn, this propensity
will depend on the extent and pattern of the OLI advantages. The country’s path in
these stages is determined by three variables. First is the size and structure of
resources. Second is the economic development strategy, that is, the orientation of an
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economy to be export oriented or import substitute regime. Third is the role of
government (Dunning and Narula, 1996).
The relation between capital flows and economic growth can be discussed in
the context of endogenous growth model. In the endogenous growth theory,
increasing returns to scale, imperfect competition, human capital accumulation or
spillovers effects could avoid the decline in the marginal physical product of capital.
The most influential endogenous model presented by Romer (1990), has many
interesting implications for international economic integration. According to the
model, the higher the interest rate, the lower the present value of the profits the
machine monopolist will earn, and the less she will bid at auction for the design to
which it relates. A lower price of new designs means less income for inventors. It,
therefore, means fewer inventors, and so fewer inventions, slower expansion in
producing capital goods and, therefore, a slower rate of economic growth. This
negative growth-interest relationship with the positive growth-interest relation, derived
from consumer optimization, determine the long-run equilibrium of interest and
growth. Romer’s model concentrates on the steady state, where the ratio of
consumption to income is constant. That means that higher interest implies faster
income growth, since income and consumption have to grow at a common speed at
the steady state. Romer concludes that access to the stock of foreign knowledge leads
to a doubling in the rate of invention causing the both growth rate and interest rate to
increase. The new growth theory views FDI as a composite bundle of capital, know
how and technology. Its contribution to growth is through technology transfer and
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technology and skill diffusion in the countries importing FDI. As has been cited in the
literature, the two greatest benefits for a recipient country from FDI are the
technology transfer and the externalities, measured in terms of spillovers generated by
the FDI.
Empirically, a number of studies have analyzed the impacts of capital flow on
domestic investment. Feldstein (1994) find that the relationship between capital flows
and domestic investment tends to be one to one. A one dollar increase in capital flows
will raise domestic investment by one dollar. In the same line Borensztein et al. (1998)
find that the impact of an increase in FDI by one dollar on domestic investment is
greater than one dollar, but only in a setting with sufficiently high level of human
capital. Bosworth and Collins (1999) analyze the relationship between various types of
private capital flows and both investment and saving, focusing on the variation over
time within countries rather than the variation across countries. They find that FDI and
FBL have a strong impact on domestic investment while FPI has positive but
insignificant effect on investment. World Bank (2002) replicates Bosworth and Collins
study using a data set with broader country coverage and a longer period. The study
concludes the same results that private capital flows (long-run plus short-run) are seen
to have close one to one relationship with domestic investment and the capital flows
are associated with a broader stimulation of demand that implies that not all private
capital flows are invested.
In sum, we can say the interactions between capital flows and domestic
investment depends on first, the nature of capital flows (short run versus long run) and
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its composition (the magnitude of each type i.e. FDI, FBL, and FPI) second, to what
extent the domestic economies are globally integrated, third, the domestic investment
climate.
5-

Private Investment and Government Expenditure

The relationship between private investment and public expenditure should be
considered in designing any macroeconomic policy. In general, traditional investment
models do not offer a consistent theoretical rationale for having government
expenditure as a determinant factor in capital formation. However, various empirical
studies have included it in investment studies to test the “crowding-out” hypothesis
(Aschauer 1989 and Looney et al, 1997). These studies argued that the influence of
public investment should be considered since public capital may compete or may
complement private capital.
The literature identifies two channels through which the public expenditure and
private investment may compete resulting in “crowding out” or may complement
resulting in “crowding in”. Given the relative scarcity in domestic finance, if the public
investments depend on borrowing, this will lead to an increase in the market interest
rate (the price of these resources) and thus the cost of capital for private investor. The
result will be a decrease in private investment. Hence, the public investment is
crowding out private investment. On the other hand, public investment may be
beneficial for encouraging and developing private investment public investment in
infrastructure may enhance the productivity of private capital and, hence, increase
private investment. Hence, the public investment is crowding in private investment. In
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addition, the government investment that is used as a counter-cyclical economic policy
tool to harness business cycle may stimulate aggregate demand and revitalize private
investment at least in the short run. The two channels may operate in opposite
direction, so the net effect will be for the dominant one.
Empirically, the relationship between public spending and private sector’s
productivity was examined in (Barro, 1981 and Aschauer, 1989). The empirical
analysis of Aschauer (1989) is based on the neoclassical model in which private nonresidential investment was assumed to be a function of government investment,
government consumption and the rate of return on private non-financial corporate
capital. It was shown that government investment “crowded-out” private investment
while increasing marginal productivity of private capital by a factor of one to one. He
argued that while both channels appear to be operating, the latter comes to dominate,
so the net effect of a rise in public investment expenditure is likely to raise private
investment. This means that government investment had a positive effect on private
investment and caused a “crowding-in” rather than a “crowding-out.” Karras (1996)
discussed that the small size of government is a catalyst in the interaction. It increases
the productivity since the marginal productivity of the government services is
negatively related to government size.
It is worth noting that the crowding out arguments is based on the assumption
that the economy has well developed and efficiently functioning financial markets.
These conditions are dubious in the context of developing countries. Hence, the public
investment may not necessarily compete with private sector for the scarce resources.
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Also in certain cases, capital market imperfection may imply that firms are rationed in
their access to external firnds. Thus, credit may be available but banks may not provide
it because the limited liability of firms and agency costs associated with informational
asymmetries and costly contract enforceability. As a result, the private sector and
overall economy may benefit from public investments.
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CHAPTER II
MEASURING UNCERTAINTY OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES IN
OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES
This chapter constructs uncertainty measures for some of macroeconomic
variables that have been chosen from the first chapter to estimate a model for how the
uncertainty affects the interaction between domestic investment and capital inflows in
a sample of oil producing countries and Middle East and North African countries
(MENA). Through this work we explore the sources and the importance of
uncertainty in those countries and then turn to discuss and examine empirically
different approaches to measure uncertainty. Specifically, we measure uncertainty
proxies for inflation, exchange rate, real interest rate- as a proxy for real cost of
capital, credit availability, and oil price using ARCH model originated by Engle (1982)
and GARCH model developed by Bollerslev (1986). Since the specific source of
uncertainty, short lives versus long lived, has important implications in analyzing the
impact of uncertainty on investment behavior, we will apply the recent work in
GARCH literature, component GARCH, developed by (Engle and Lee, 1999). The
chapter will focus on decomposing uncertainty into its component using component
GARCH, CGARCH, on all variable of interest when it is applicable. We also try to
investigate the impact of different shocks to oil price on the short run and long run oil
price uncertainty. As a first step in modeling and estimating any time series, tests for
unit root and stationary are important. In this chapter we provide more powerful unit
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root tests than simple OLS Dickey Fuller tests by using GLS detrended class of unit
root tests. The strategy developed by Ng and Perron (2001) will be adopted.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the different
sources of uncertainty facing oil producing countries and why those variables are
important in investment models. In section 3 we review uncertainty definitions and
discuss some measures of uncertainty and explain why we chose one rather than
others. Also in this section we discuss various econometric models of uncertainty and
present the models used in this study. Section 4 presents the data and the empirical
results. Component GARCH model of oil price is estimated in section 5.
1- Macroeconomic Uncertainty in Oil Producing Countries
The previous chapter proposes certain variables to be considered as uncertainty
proxies in investment model in oil producing countries. In this section I will focus on
these proposed variables. In particular, we consider uncertainty of inflation, exchange
rate, credit cost (real interest rate), the credit availability, and oil price. The latter may
not be important in other countries, but it is in our study because most of countries in
our sample are exporting oil.
Inflation is a measure of the relative price of goods today and goods
tomorrow; thus, uncertainty in tomorrow’s price impairs the efficiency of today’s
allocation decisions. Inflation is often taken as a summary measure of the overall
macroeconomic stance, and hence the volatility of its unpredictable component can be
viewed as an indicator of overall macroeconomic uncertainty (Eberly, 1993). The
unpredictability of future inflation is a major component of the welfare loss associated
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with inflation. When inflation is unpredictable, risk-averse economic agents will incur a
loss, even if prices and quantities are perfectly adjusted in all markets (Engle 1983). In
addition, high inflation rates tend to be volatile. The inflation and uncertainty
surrounding it have many impacts on investment. Unanticipated high inflation erodes
the real vahie of financial assets and the volatility of inflation increases the risk
associated with holding them. The recent literature regarding asymmetric information
in credit markets indicates how higher rates of inflation can hamper the effective
functioning of the financial sector, including financial markets. The lower real interest
rates associated with high inflation rates increase the level of frictions in credit markets
and consequently reducing investment spending (Hubbard and Glenn 1994). Huizinga,
1993 indicates that the typical view of the link between inflation uncertainty and
capital expenditures may capture important implications of portfolio diversification but
not capture the entire link between uncertainty and investment. In the long run,
increased uncertainty raises the cost of capital, given the assumption of irreversibility.
For a new firm higher uncertainty would lower the optimal capital stock (Abel and
Eberly 1999). On the other hand, existing firms would have greater difficulties in
selling capital if uncertainty rose. Also, if the future economic environment is expected
to be more uncertain than present, then the required profitability level on new
investment projects will rise, leading to an obvious reduction in investment (Caballero
1999). In contrast, aggregate capital spending is likely to be better achieved by stable
and credible macroeconomic environment than by frequent changes in interest rates or
tax rates (Pindyck 1991). The countries in our study have experienced high inflation
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rates in the eighties and nineties. Also, after implementing economic reform programs
in these countries the inflation uncertainty rose during the process of economic
adjustment. Some countries succeeded in curbing inflation but the others do not and
still in the process of reform.
Exchange rate volatility is another source of macroeconomic uncertainty. One
of the important channel through which exchange rate changes and its uncertainty
transmit to the economy is the investment. Exchange rate affects domestic investment
through three forces; sectoral profitability effect, location Effect, and portfolio and
wealth effect, Goldberg (1990). Details for this point are discussed in Chapter I.
However, we mention to some points regarding exchange rate uncertainty. Sectoral
profitability is affected by both Exchange rate changes and exchange rate uncertainty.
Depreciation (appreciation) changes relative-price which increase (decrease) demands
for exports and import-competing goods. Increased (decreased) profitability of
domestic producers caused by depreciation (appreciation) would lead firms to expand
(contract) investment in capacity and new plant and equipment. On the other hand,
exchange rate uncertainty affects the sectoral profitability via its impact on expected
costs of production and revenues from international sales. The sign of this relationship
depends on the balance of the: (i) negative effects from risk aversion of investors; (ii)
negative effects of investment irreversibilities; (iii) positive effects from convexity in
prices; and (iv) negative effects from a profit and price uncertainty relationship that is
possible under imperfect competition (Goldberg 1993). The “location effect” refers to
the entry and exit of firms from the market in response to exchange rate changes and
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exchange rate uncertainty. (Goldberg 1990). These effects depend on the barriers to
entry, the sunk cost of exiting. The location channel for the impact of exchange rate
uncertainty on investment depends on the exposure of both domestic and foreign
producers to foreign exchange rate changes. High exchange rate uncertainty causes
more reluctance to enter or exit industries. Thus the elasticity of investment to
exchange rate changes will be affected in high uncertainty periods (Goldberg 1990).
The “portfolio and wealth effect” of exchange rate changes refers to the redistribution
of wealth across international investors via risk aversion and home assets preferences.
For example, if the dollar depreciates against the euro, the Europeans gain wealth
relative to Americans. Tins redistribution of wealth may shift aggregate portfolio and
direct investment demands.. But if the Europeans have strong home assets preferences,
the wealth distribution may reduce overall investment in the U.S.
Based on these results we can say the sign of the impact of exchange rate
uncertainty on investment is an empirical matter. In developing countries the view may
be different. The substitutability between traded and nontraded goods is very weak or
may not exist because the traded good sectors in most of developing countries are
exporting primary goods, raw material and oil. Also these countries do not have a
well-diversified manufacturing base. Therefore, if demand for traded goods rises due
to depreciation, resources may not be reallocated toward this sector and away from
the production of nontraded goods. Another contractionary effect of exchange rate
depreciation originates on the supply side. The increased demand for factor inputs by
tradable sector raises the cost of nontradables. Furthermore, the cost of intermediate
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goods required in producing nontraded goods will increase due to depreciation. So
under exchange rate changes, uncertain economic environment and costly reallocation
of resources across sectors, we expect that the response of resource transfer and
investment to exchange rate changes is weak.
The high exchange rate volatility that characterizes developing economies
creates an uncertain environment for investment decisions by making absolute and
relative sectoral profitability (traded vs. non-traded goods sectors) and the cost of new
capital goods (because of their high import content) all harder to predict. Ceteris
paribus, increased volatility of these variables makes price signals less informative
about the relative profitability of investment across sectors, likely hampering and
distorting investment decisions (Serven, 2003). In the international finance context an
exogenous inflows of capital could lead to a real exchange rate depreciation or
appreciation. The effect depends on how these inflows are used, to finance domestic
spending or to accumulate capital in the traded or non-traded goods sector.
Alternatively, stabilized exchange rate policy may lead to a real appreciation and
higher domestic interest rates, inducing greater capital inflows and more foreign
investment.
One of the hypotheses to be tested in this thesis is the impact of capital inflows
on investment. The neoclassical theory of investment predicts a strong and negative
relationship between private investment and the user cost of capital. However, this
prediction is not supported by empirical tests applied to the data from industrial and
developing countries that find a weak and insignificant link between the two (Chirinko,
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1993). Economists have provided one explanation arguing that the quantity of external
credits rather than the costs (interest rates) may be more binding in developing
economies. Credit constraint in developing countries is likely to be more important
because, in part, the quantity of financial resources is limited. Given the fact that most
of financial markets in developing countries including MENA are weak and shallow,
the researcher claims that capital inflows are channeled via credit provided by banks in
these countries. Since the capital inflows are volatile, then its volatility may be
reflected in total credit provided by banks. Thus, our concern in this chapter is to
explore capital inflows volatility embodied in credit availability uncertainty.
Even though the empirical studies have found no significant effect of the cost
of capital on investment, the uncertainty surrounding the real cost of credit may also
play a major role in investment decision. Interest rate uncertainty can have two effects
on an investment decision. First: the expected value of future payments from
investment can be increased due to unpredictable fluctuation in interest rate and this
makes the investment more attractive. Second, given the irreversibility of most of
private investment in developing countries the uncertainty over the future interest rate
can lead a postponement of investment. In our investment model, we need to test the
claim that uncertainty stemming from financial markets either from credit availability
or real cost of credit plays an important role in determining private investment in
developing countries.
The relationship between oil price uncertainty and investment can be explained
theoretically and practically. Theory predicts that uncertainty about future oil prices
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makes investment behavior more sluggish. The idea is that higher oil price uncertainty
implies high possibility for such prices to be reversed, and hence induces firm to
postpone its decision to adopt new capital goods. When decision makers face
uncertainty about future prices and returns and when their decisions are irreversible,
there will be an option value to delay the investment decision. The value of this option
increases when uncertainty increases. The expectation that heightened uncertainty, by
delaying projects, would lead to a fall in aggregate investment. Practically, oil price
uncertainty means oil revenues uncertainty for oil exporting countries and means costs
uncertainty of importing ones. This uncertainty feeds uncertainty in the
macroeconomic environment, especially when these revenues/costs contribute with
high percent in economic development programs.
The effect of macroeconomic instability on growth comes mainly from the
effect of uncertainty on private investment. Inflation, real exchange rates, real cost of
credit, terms of trade and other key macroeconomic variables are much more uncertain
than in industrial economies. The implications of such volatility for aggregate
performance have stimulated some attention in recent empirical literature. In
investment, the vehicle of economic growth, this concern has been updated by recent
theoretical work identifying several channels through which uncertainty can affect on
investment. However, some of these effects of uncertainty work in mutually opposing
directions, and their magnitude depend on a variety of factors identified in the
literature. As a result, the sign of the investment-uncertainty relationship is
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indeterminate on theoretical grounds and the empirical work becomes the last resort to
help policy analysis.
2-

Uncertainty and Volatility: Definition and Measurement

This section provides an overview of different approaches to measure
uncertainty, referring to some empirical literature in investment. We discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of each measure and argue why we focus on GARCH.
We conclude the section with the definition of uncertainty.
In empirical literature we can identify two main approaches to obtain
uncertainty measures. The first one is to use historical values of the variable to
establish statistical or econometric estimations of the variability of it and then use this
measure as a proxy for uncertainty. We refer it as ex-post uncertainty measures. The
second approach is to estimate uncertainty from surveys of economic expectations and
we refer it as ex-ante uncertainty measure or survey based model for uncertainty.
2.1 Ex-ante Uncertainty Measures (Survev-Based Measure)
In the survey based-models we obtain the standard deviation from the point
forecasts made at a point in time by several different forecasters. This variability is
actually a measure of the disagreement among the forecasters and is used as a proxy
for uncertainty. In their remarkable work, Zamowitz and Lambros (1987), introduce
the most direct measures of uncertainty that can be used from survey of expectations,
and use it to study inflation uncertainty. To get the idea we give an example, the oldest
quarterly survey of macroeconomic forecasters in the United States, which is the
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Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). It was began in 1968 and conducted by the
American Statistical Association (ASA) and a National Bureau of Economic Research
(NBER) and known as the ASA-NBER survey. In 1990 Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia and NBER assumed responsibility for that survey.
In brief, the forecasters in the SPF come largely from the business world and
Wall Street. Most of he questions ask for point forecasts, for a range of variables and
forecast horizons. Also each forecaster is asked to attach a probability to each of the
number of intervals in which the variable of interest might fall, in the current year and
in the next year (Diebold 1998). In fact, we can retrieve a direct measure of
uncertainty from the standard deviation around those probabilities. In addition, this
measure summarizes the dispersion among forecasters at a point in time, but do not
measure each forecaster’s certainty about their inflation forecast. Also this method
provides measures of dispersion such as the difference between the upper and lower
quartile forecasts and the difference between the maximum and minimum forecasts.
Among the benefits of survey-based measure is that better represents what
economic agents really perceived at the time they made decisions. If these surveys
reflect the market’s perceptions, then the level of uncertainty in the market about the
expected realization of the most important macroeconomic variables can be acquired
from them (Sepulveda 2003). The validity of survey measures of uncertainty is often
questioned, since they do not take account of the level of uncertainty of each
individual forecaster (Grier and Peny 2000). We can argue that in a given period each
forecaster could be extremely uncertain about inflation and then submit similar point
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estimates of future inflation, and then the survey based measure of inflation uncertainty
would significantly underestimate the actual level of uncertainty about future inflation.
However, there is some evidence that the dispersion of inflation forecasts across
survey respondents is positively correlated with the uncertainty of each individual
forecaster (Zamowitz and Lambros 1987).
Most of the countries in our study did not conduct this measure on macro
level. We might find micro studies about specific industry conducted by MNCs before
they inter the market. Also the macroeconomic environment in these countries is very
uncertain not only due to economic factors but also due to political factors. In
addition, the governments have the power to intervene and monitor the market. Those
factors make forecasts difficult to get for those countries.
2.2 Ex-post Uncertainty Measures (Historical Data-Based Measure!
In those measures total volatility of a certain variable consists of two
components expected and unexpected. We can distinguish between two main
categories. The first is the conditional variance, in the sense that volatility depends on
the past volatility and the second is the unconditional variance. The conditional
variance should be the stronger measure of unexpected volatility while the
unconditional variance should be stronger measure of total volatility, which includes
both components.
According to the literature mentioned above, uncertainty means that the
economic environment tomorrow is not known today and at best, there exists a set of
alternatives, mutually exclusive, one and only one of which will materialize (Dreze
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1999). Accordingly, uncertainty refers to situations in which the probability of future
events cannot be determined. This is different from a risky event for which an explicit
probability can be assigned. Future volatility in an economic variable is the sum of both
predictable and unpredictable components. The uncertainty of an economic variable
can then be more precisely defined as the unpredictable part of volatility (Crawford
and Kasumovich 1996, Grier and Perry 1998).
Volatility o f economic variable =Volatility o f predictable component +Volatility o f unpredictable component
Or equivalently:
=Expected Variability + Unexpected variability (Uncertainty)

As noted above volatility is a stochastic process since the stochastic process is a
variable that evolves over time and at least part of it is random, and the other is partly
deterministic Intuitively, uncertainty of an economic variable is the degree to which
the future value of that variable is unknown in the sense of not being predictable, given
past performance (Golob 1993).
We compute the unconditional variance, total variability, using conventional
variance formula, which gives us a time-invariant measure of the average of the
squared deviation from the mean. To get unconditional variance as a time variant
measure of uncertainty, we use “rolling” or “moving” variance. For instance, assume
we have time series for y variable from 1975 to 2003 and we want to construct a
measure of volatility using five years moving average, n=5. The five-year overlapping
periods start with 1976-80, then we drop 1976 year and add 1981. So, we have 24
time series observations (1980-2003) on uncertainty starting from t=1980 for the
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period 1976-80 to t= 2003 for the period 1999-2003. The rolling variance with
moving period window n, n=5 in our example, is computed as follows:

( 1)
/=!

In the investment literature Pindyck and Solimano (1993) work with the
moving average standard deviation of the relevant time series to construct uncertainty
measure. This measure of total variability as a proxy for uncertainty can be criticized
on both economic and statistical grounds. One standard criticism is that at least part of
the total variability of a variable is predictable (Crawford and Kasumovich 1996). For
instance, the rise in long-run variability may be due to a certain policy, which may be
announced well in advance of its implementation and therefore highly predictable.
Thus the series may be very variable, however it is very predictable and easy to
forecast. What is important for economic agents is the unpredictable part of the series,
simply because greater unpredictability implies more uncertainty. Also, the range of
moving average is chosen arbitrary.
In the same line of thinking, the variance of the unpredictable part of the series
can be considered by specifying a stochastic process of that series. This method of
measuring volatility can be summarized in two steps. First: we set up a forecasting
equation for the uncertainty variable as in equation 2 and estimate it to obtain the
residual- the unpredictable part of the fluctuations of that variable, as follows:

yt =zt8 +et

(2)

55

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

where Zta set of variables in the information set. Second: We compute the variance of
the estimated residuals as uncertainty measure. In our example, we estimate equation
2 having annual data over the five-year overlapping periods. The variance of the
residuals from these regressions (24 regressions) is the measure of uncertainty.
7 ,-i Z
i =0

—i

(3)

In fact we can consider first and second methods mentioned above as one, since the
unpredictable part of a stochastic process is assumed to be given by the deviation from
the mean. However, the second one involves the process that generates the predictable
part of the stochastic process. The stochastic process that generates the predictable
part can be any ARMA (p, q). In general, applying this method requires the correct
information set to rule out the predictable part.
Goldberg (1993) constructed exchange rate volatility using rolling twelve
quarters ARMA (1, 1) regressions over the entire sample. Aizenman and Marion
(1993) estimate the predictable part by AR process and calculate the standard
deviation of the difference between the actual and predicted series as a measure of
volatility. Ghosal and Loungani (1996) used AR (2) process to measure uncertainty of
industry product price.
As we see in the rolling variance equation, it gives an equal weight to
correlated shocks and single large outliers so it could significantly overstate the actual
level of uncertainty. Also this method is based on the assumption of constant
unconditional variance and the range of moving average is chosen arbitrary.
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Unfortunately, these assumptions are not realistic. In spite of these shortfalls, this
measure is commonly used due to the data limitations. But the most important
criticism is that these measures do not tell us the model that governs the uncertainty
itself as we will see next.
Engle (1982) introduced the ARCH methodology, which was later extended to
incorporate a lagged dependent variable in the conditional variance (GARCH) by
Bollerslev (1986). In contrast to rolling standard deviation and dispersion, the ad hoc
measures of uncertainty, this approach estimates uncertainty of the variable on the
basis of an econometric model. This method is presumed to capture volatility in each
period more accurately than simple rolling standard deviations, which give equal
weight to correlated shocks and single large outliers. Engle’s (1982) proposed the
following model to capture serial correlation in volatility:
y t =xtp + st
crf = ao+acisf-i+oczs 2~2+ .......... + a qs]~q

(4)

where Et| <&t-i ~ N (0, o2t) is the innovation in the series, et2 and <Xi are the ARCH
parameters up to q order, oto>0 and <Xi> 0. The ARCH model characterizes the
distribution of the stochastic error et conditional on the realized values of the set of
variables <Dt-i = {xt, yt-i, Xt-i>. The stylized facts for many economic and financial data
are captured in this model. These facts are thick tails for the unconditional distribution,
changing in variance over time, and volatility clustering, and serially uncorrelated
movements. A number of lags are required in many of the applications with the linear
ARCH (q) model. Computational problem may arise when the model presents a high
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order. To facilitate such computation, Bollerslev (1986) proposed a generalized
ARCH or GARCH (p, q) model to include lagged values of the conditional variance.
The GARCH (p, q) can be written as:
y t - x tfi+8t
er} = a o + a i e U + ......+ a qe t q+ ylcrU + ......+ y p<T?-p

(5)

where y„ are the GARCH parameters up to order p. The conditional variance o2t (the
proxy of uncertainty) is one-period ahead forecast variance based on the past
information and it is a function of three terms: (I) - the mean level of volatility, (II) the ARCH terms which are the lag of squared errors from the mean equation, news
about volatility from the previous period, and (III) - the GARCH terms which are the
last lagged forecast variance. The economic agent predicts the uncertainty by forming
a weighted average of a long-term average (the constant), the forecasted variance
from last period (the GARCH term), and information about volatility observed in the
previous period (the ARCH term). To ensure a well-defined process, all the
parameters in the infinite order AR representation must be non-negative, where it is
assumed that the roots of the polynomial lie outside the unit circle. For a GARCH (1,
1) process this will be ensured if ai and yx are non-negative. It follows also that gt is
covariance stationary if and only if ai +yi<l. In most applications a lag length of
p=q=l, will represent the conditional variance, Bollerslev, Chou and Kroner (1992).
In this chapter conditional variances from both GARCH (0, 1) and GARCH (1,
1) are used to generate conditional variances of inflation, exchange rate, real interest
rate, and the credit. The GARCH (1, 1) is estimated first for each series, and when it
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fails to fit the data GARCH (1,1) is applied. The use of the GARCH approaches to
model volatility seems to be attractive. However, one criticism of the econometric
approach to measuring uncertainty is that such a measure seems to be highly sensitive
to model specification (Carruth, Dickerson, and Henley 2000b). As well, they require
high frequency data and longer time series and this may be the reason for its limited
application in investment. Also both this measure and the rolling variance of
uncertainty are backward looking in nature, in contrast to the survey-based measure of
uncertainty, as we mentioned above. In spite of these criticisms, GARCH methods
have been used to derive measures of uncertainty and numerous studies have found a
relationship between the resultant variable and investment.
2.3 Components GARCH (CGARCH)
An interesting development of the basic GARCH model is the so-called
components GARCH (CGARCH) of Engle and Lee (1999). They decompose the
conditional volatility from a GARCH model into a time varying trend and deviations
from that trend. In other words, into permanent volatility component or long run
volatility and transitory volatility or short run volatility. Those authors describe the
long memory behavior of the volatility process as the sum of two conventional models
where one has nearly a unit root, and the other has a much rapid decay. Following
Engle and Lee (1999) and Ding and Granger (1996), there has been some recent work
on decomposing macroeconomic volatility and assessing its impact on the real
economy, which emphasize on the importance of the source of uncertainty Baum et
al. (2001), Chadha and Samo (2002). They provide a differential effect of uncertainty
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on investment depending on whether it is long run or short run. Engle and lee set out
the GARCH (1, 1) model as characterized by reversion to a constant mean (m ):
& +CC\(e h -vr)+ yl (o il -

(6)

Where m is the unconditional variance, (£?_,-«x) serves as the shock to the volatility
of the relevant variable and a +y represents the mean reverting rate or the persistence
rate. The question that Engle and Lee raised is whether the long-run volatility
represented by m in GARCH (1,1), is truly constant over time. They replace m with
the long run volatility qt, which is given a time series representation and allowed to
evolve in AR manner. Thus the model is written as:
<7?- q t = a i(e h ~ q tJ +Yx( c h ~q,-X)

Temporary component (7)

qt = ocq + P<lt-l + <
P(s } - \ - ° } - \ )

Permanent component (8)

Equation (7) defines the temporary component cr?-#,, whilst equation (8) is the
permanent equation. When 0< a

<1 short run volatility converges to its mean of 0,

while if 0 < p < 1 the long run component converges to its mean of Oo / (1-p). As the
long run volatility is more persistent than the short run, it is also assumed that 0< ai
+7i < p<l. For non- negative variance, sufficient conditions are that ai, yi, and ao are
positive and that yi ><p > 0.
The interpretation of the volatility component is straightforward (Engle and
Lee, 1999). First, when ai 4yx <1 the component model allows reversion to a varying
mean qt . Secondly: the short-run volatility component mean reverts to zero at a
geometric rate of a+ y and the long run volatility component itself evolves over time
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following an AR process, which, if 0<p<l, will converge to a constant level defined by
Oo / (1-p). Thirdly, the model assumes that the long-run component has a much slower
mean reverting rate than the short run component, or in other words, the long run
component is more persistent than the short run one, i.e., 0 < ai + yi < p <1.
3-

Data and Empirical Results

The data set used in this chapter applies to the 1981-2003 period and contains
12 oil producing countries and Israel. Some of the oil producing countries are
members in OPEC such as Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, UAE, and Venezuela. The other 3 countries, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, are
producing oil but are not members in OPEC. Israel is not producing oil but it is
included in the sample to be a comparison point in the Middle East area. The sample is
selected based on the potential economic cooperation among some of Middle Eastern
countries and some of North African Countries, which is called MENA countries. Also
the selection is based on the availability of data in monthly frequencies in the period of
study. Also the period of study is constrained with the availability of data on annual
investment in these countries from 1981 and the investment model under uncertainty
will be investigated in the next chapter. We model uncertainty for some
macroeconomic variables such as, inflation, exchange rate, cost of credit, and credit in
these countries, in addition to oil price. All variables are in monthly frequencies and
are taken, except oil prices, from the World Development Indicators and International
Financial Statistics of International Monetary Fund (IMF) CD-ROMs 2003. Data on
oil prices are taken from the OPEC Annual Bulletin. The data spans from 1974:01 to
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2003:10 for the oil price and from 1981:01 to 2003:10 for the other variables. We
utilize G/ARCH and CGARCH specification as indicated above to generate
conditional variances. Also we will estimate short run and long run uncertainty when
the model is applicable, for all series. We can organize the procedure to generate
conditional variances in the following steps: first we test for stationarity and check the
distribution characteristics of variable of interest; second: we estimate G/ARCH; third:
we test for the presence of G/ARCH in the residual, using GARCH-LM test, to make
sure that the model is well-specified; finally: if the G/GARCH is significant then we
generate the conditional variance to use it as a measure of uncertainty. If the G/ARCH
is not significant, then we look for another measure of uncertainty as cited in the
literature above.
For stationarity test, we take the log of all series, except interest rate, and
apply the traditional unit root tests. The Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF), PhillipsPerron (PP) and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS) unit root tests are
for implemented with and without trend on the log level. In all test we do not reject
the existence of unit root. The results show that all series are non-stationaiy except
real interest rate in Egypt and Israel. When we carry out the test for the log first
differenced, we find evidence that the variables are stationary. Namely, the PP tests
suggest stationarity in all variables considered. The ADF tests further substantiate the
stationarity of inflation, credit and real interest rate when expressed in log first
differenced (for brevity the results of the ADF test are not reported her).
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It is well known that Dickey Fuller unit root type tests have low power; hence
Phillips and Perron (1988) propose a nonparametric modification to deal with serial
correlation of errors in these tests. Schwert (1989) suggests that there may be
substantial size distortions in finite samples when the data shows negative
autocorrelations in first difference. ADF tests may require a substantial lag to deal with
moving average errors; hence have low degrees of freedom and low power. To
address this loss of power, Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock (1996), hereafter ERS,
present an asymptotically efficient test of the unit root hypothesis based on the quasidifferenced data obtained from the GLS regression. They suggest that GLS local
detrending yields substantial power gains over the standard ADF unit root test.
Inflation rates and Exchange rates and other financial series often display large
negative MA roots. Ng and Perron (1996) suggest modified tests and show that their
test maintains good power whilst correcting for the moving average errors
encountered in most macroeconomic series. Furthermore Ng and Perron (2001)
suggest utilizing GLS detrending and construct four further modified test statistics. In
this chapter we employ NG and Perron tests and ERS. The evidence in tables 2.1, 2.2,
2.3, and 2.4 shows that the DFGLS tests proposed by ERS and Modified tests
suggested by Ng and Perron fail to reject the null of unit root in most series with few
exceptions in real interest rate in Egypt and Israel and in exchange rate in Indonesia
and Venezuela. When we run the tests on log first differences we got stationary series
for all variables.
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We apply the univariate GARCH model to the log-differenced monthly series.
In this model the mean equation includes a constant and AR terms. The estimated AR
and GARCH models for the series considered in this study are reported in tables 2-5,
2-6,2-7,2-8. The coefficients of fitted GARCH (p, q) have the theoretical signs and
magnitude, although insignificant in some countries. The conditional variance
equations are all stable with a^yi <1. All of the specifications are GARCH (1, 1)
Except Qatar where an ARCH (1) specification was the simplest acceptable by the
data.
We first consider the estimation results of inflation uncertainty. In Table 2.5,
the intercept in the conditional variance xn is significant for most countries however it
is not in Algeria Iran, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. The lagged squared error
term, on, is larger in Venezuela, Israel and Egypt compared with the other countries
which reflects high persistence of short run volatility in the future uncertainty proxied
by conditional variance. The lagged conditional variance terms are highly significant in
all countries. Also the uncertainty process is stable in all countries, where ofvyi is less
than one.
From the conditional standard deviation graph, Figure 2.1, we can notice that
the inflation uncertainty declines in Egypt, Israel, Qatar, Syria, Iran, and Venezuela.
However, it is less persistent in Israel compared with Egypt, Qatar, arid Syria. For
Israel the inflation uncertainty declined sharply after 1986 and almost stationary. This
is attributed to the economic reform program, which started in 1985 in Israel, in 1991
in Egypt, and in 1994 in Syria. In Algeria, and Venezuela the inflation uncertainty was
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very fluctuated and persistent. The stability process is supported by lower values of
auyi in both countries. However, it maintains at a higher level. The uncertainty
bounded in 1992 in Algeria when the civil war ended and maintains at a higher level.
However, the uncertainty continues to fluctuate in Venezuela due to political
instability. In Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Nigeria, the inflation uncertainty
process seems to be stable over time except some spikes after and during Kuwait
invasion, this might drive all prices up. In sum, we can say, in most of oil producing
countries, inflation uncertainty is bounded and stable and this may be due to attempts
in these countries to control inflation via different packages of fiscal and monetary
policies.
Examining the real exchange rate uncertainty equations in Table 2.S, we can
conclude the following: there is no G/ARCH model for Tunisia and Saudi Arabia. So
we measure exchange rate uncertainty using 6 month moving average of the squared
error. By examining the exchange data for these countries, we claim that 6 months is
enough to capture the exchange rate volatility. For the other countries the G/ARCH
models are successfully specified. The intercept in the conditional variance is
significant for Indonesia, Israel and Venezuela but not for other countries this may be
due to the fixed exchange rate regime in these countries which was dominant until the
late of nineties. The lagged squared error is significant in all countries. Except Egypt,
Indonesia, and Israel the ARCH coefficient was very small in suggesting their
persistence of volatility. The lagged variance terms, GARCH, are highly significant in
all countries. Nigeria, where ARCH model with one lag is specified, the coefficient of
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ARCH is large suggesting short run persistence of volatility. Also, the exchange rate
uncertainty models in those countries are stable, where o^Yi < 1•
The conditional standard deviation graphs, Figure 2.2, are quiet comparable in
Algeria, Egypt, Iran, and Syria. We can notice jumps in uncertainty in Algeria, Egypt
and Syria, after that the uncertainty declines. The reason is that most of those
countries experienced high inflation rate, overvalued currencies and other
macroeconomics problem before the economic reform and they followed the same
procedure in financial reform, which is to float their currencies. Most of those
countries float their currency in the mid of nineties after a long era of following fixed
exchange rate regime with some officials movements in exchange rates. This is
indicated by the jumps in the conditional standard deviation graphs for those countries
but the timing of reform was different in each country. The IMF economists say that
the adjustment mechanism will bring a stable exchange rate after a period of
fluctuations in the exchange market depending on preconditions in each country. We
can see that from the graph. Israel was an exception from that because its currency
was floated in 1982. Also, as noted from the conditional standard variance graphs,
Figure 2.2, the exchange rate uncertainty in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait, and Qatar is
bounded, however it starts rising in Egypt in the last two years. Finally, if we look at
the conditional standard deviation graph in Indonesia and Venezuela, we will notice
that exchange rate uncertainty was almost stable in the past until 1998 and after that it
became very volatile. The explanation for that is founded in the currency crises that
blow away Asian countries.
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The results of estimating the real interest rate uncertainty, in Table 2.3, show
that the intercept in the conditional variance is significant for all countries except Iran
and Saudi Arabia. Also, the lagged error terms in all countries are significant. The
uncertainty process of real interest rate is stationary in all countries where %yi <1.
For Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Tunisia, and Saudi Arabia, where ARCH model with one
lag is specified, the coefficient of ARCH is larger in Indonesia and Egypt but very tiny
in Iran and Saudi Arabia. The reason for that may be the unimportant role of the
interest rate in these countries, as Islamic countries. Also, this means the shocks to
uncertainty are more persistent in the short run in Egypt and Indonesia compared with
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. This is supported by the conditional standard
deviation graphs, Figure 2.3, In Egypt and Israel, the uncertainty is bounded but it
takes longer time in Egypt than Israel. The conditional standard variance became less
volatile after 1986 in Israel and after 1998 in Egypt This is explained by the economic
reform steps which are taken earlier in Israel in 1986 whereas in 1991 in Egypt. In
Algeria, the real interest rate increases over time perhaps due to the high inflation rates
in this country.
Considering the uncertainty about the total credit, table 2.4, the intercept in the
conditional variance is significant for all countries except Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
and Venezuela. The GARCH (1, 1) was specified and was significant for all countries
except Tunisia where ARCH (1) was significant. The uncertainty process of real
interest rate is stationary in all countries except Israel where q.,yi =1.02. From the
conditional standard deviation graphs we can notice that the uncertainty surrounding
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total credit in Algeria, Indonesia, Syria, and Kuwait is increasing over time and this is
supported by the small ARCH coefficient in these countries. The reason for that may
be the volatility of capital inflows to those countries that included in the total credit. In
Gulf countries Saudi Arabia and Qatar seem to have the same pattern of uncertainty.
The uncertainty of total credit in Algeria, Indonesia, UAE, Kuwait, and Syria is
increasing over time. However, the level of uncertainty is different in each country.
For Israel, we can notice the effect of economic reform in 1986 on total credit
uncertainty; it fell sharply and became stable except the period from 1993 to 1995.
When we apply CGARCH to all series, as the second step after successful
GARCH/ARCH specification, unfortunately component GARCH in most of the series
is insignificant and negative in some cases, which implies model’s instability except for
oil price series. The good news here is the well-fitted CGARCH model for oil prices.
This enable us to go further and investigate the effects of old and recent shocks to oil
prices to extract the short and long run uncertainty as we will see in the following
section.
4-

Estimating Component GARCH of Oil Price

Given the importance of oil is produced in Gulf area and Middle Eastern
countries, the political and economic instability in these countries is important for both
producing countries and the rest of the world because this instability will be reflected
by some way in the price of oil. Although prices of raw material are often modeled as
geometric Brownian motions, it could be argued that they should somehow be related
to long-run production costs (Dixit & Pindyck 1994). As the price of oil might
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fluctuate up and down in the short run in response to wars or political instability in oil
producing countries, or in response to the weakening and strengthening of the OPEC
cartel, in the longer run it ought to be drawn back towards the marginal cost of
producing oil. Thus as Dixit and Pindyck suggest, the oil price should be modeled as
mean- reverting process.
We can use component GARCH to assess the short run volatility due to wars,
political instability, etc. and the long run one. As Engle and lee (1999) explain, the
long memory behavior of the volatility process can be described as the sum of two
conventional models where one has nearly a unit root, and the other has a much rapid
decay. Using the model represented by equations (6) and (7) we can estimate short run
and long run volatility of oil price. To investigate the effect of Kuwait invasion in
August 1990, September 11 attack in 2001 and Iraqi war April 2003 on the volatility
of oil price, we use two sample periods of the oil prices for each event. For the Kuwait
invasion in August 1990, we use the period of 1971:1-1990:7 and the period of
1974:1-2001:8 since the former excludes the Kuwait invasion and the latter excludes
September 11 effect. For the September 11 in 2001 we use the period of 1974:12001:8 to isolate the Sept 11 effect and the period of 1974:1-2003:3. The latter allows
assessing the Sept 11 effect and excludes the Iraqi war, which is waged in April 2003.
For the Iraqi war, we use the period of 1974:1-2003:3 and the period of 1974:1200:10. The estimation results should not differ significantly across the two sample
periods if the effect of interest is not dramatic.
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First, for the Kuwait Invasion, we can see from table 4 that the shock affects
on both components. They turn out to be significantly larger by including the invasion
period in the sample set: (a, <p) are(0.159, 0.06) for the period of 1974:1-1990:8 and
(0.351,0,107) for the period of (1974:1-2001:8). This indicates the severity of the
market rise after the invasion. The mean-reverting features of the volatility
components are also significantly affected. By including the Invasion, a + y changed
from 0.781 to 0.902. Also p does change little bit, increasing from 0.983 to 0.9981.
This suggests that the short-run volatility component mean reverts to zero at a
geometric rate of a + y =0.902 higher than its rate in the period before invasion, (a +
y) =0.781. The larger mean reverting rate means the more persistent of the volatility
expectation to the market shocks in the past. The high mean reverting rate combined
with the increase in p implies that the effect of Kuwait invasion is more permanent
than transient.
These results are consistent with oil market movements after Kuwait Invasion.
The volatility increase in the oil market persisted after the Invasion. Secondly, for the
September 11 attack in 2001, we can see from table 4 that there is a significant effect
on both transitory and permanent component. However, the shock is more transient
then permanent. This is indicated by very little change in p, declining from 0.9981 to
0.9976 and a big change in the short-run component where the mean reverting rate
declines from (a + y) =0.902 in the period before September 11 to (a + y) =0.833 in
the period of 1974:1-2003:3. This implies that the change in volatility due to the shock
decayed very quickly, smaller reverting-rate. Thirdly, for the Iraqi war in April 2003,
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we can see from table 4 that the shock is more transient than permanent. There is
almost no effect on the long run component. However, the mean reverting rate
declined from 0.833 to 0.68, which means the effect of the shock, decayed rapidly in
few months. We conclude that the Kuwait invasion is the most permanent shock to the
oil price, while the following two shocks, September 11 and Iraqi war are transient.
The dominant transitory effect of the shock to oil prices has important economic
implications since this uncertainty can be resolved quickly.
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CHAPTER HI
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN DOMESTIC INVESTMENT AND CAPITAL
INFLOWS UNDER UNCERTAINTY AND CREDIT MARKET
IMPERFECTION: DYNAMIC PANEL EVIDENCE
FROM OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES
Capital flows and their repercussions to developing economies have been the
subject of much discussion in recent years in both policy circles and academic arenas.
In addition, capital flows are considered as one of the principle means of global
integration. The strand of the discussions follows the developments in the magnitudes
and components of capital flows over the last three decades. In specific, during the
1970-1990 periods, international capital flows were mainly in the form of foreign bank
lending (FBL) directed to governments and/or to the private sector. The literature in
that period attempted to examine three main issues. First: the causes of these inflows
and whether are they driven by “push” factors (external), or by “pull” factors
(internal). The second was the policy challenges posed by resurgence in capital flows.
The third was focusing on the behavioral characteristics of the different types of
capital flows. In the 1990s, the composition of capital flows changed dramatically. It
took the form of foreign direct investment (FDI) mainly and foreign portfolio
investment (FPI). These changes motivate the literature to answer questions such as:
does FDI behave differently from FPI? Are short-run flows more volatile and subject
to sudden stop or reversals? Taking the causes of flows as given, the new literature
turned its attention toward the effects of capital flows on the recipient countries.
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Domestic investment is the most important channel through which foreign
capital flows affect economic growth. However, the role of capital flows in improving
economic performance can be limited in the presence of capital market imperfection.
For oil producing countries, capital inflows can augment private saving and help those
countries reach higher rates of capital accumulation and growth. Some types of capital
inflows such as: FDI may also accelerate growth through the transfer of technology
and management skills. Also, foreign portfolio investment (FPI) and foreign bank
loans (FBL) are seen as adding to the depth and breadth of domestic financial markets.
In this chapter a four simultaneous equations model is developed to capture the
dynamic interaction between capital inflows and domestic investment in uncertain
environment. We employ Wooldridge’s (1996) Generalized Method of Moments three
stage least square, (GMM- 3SLS), to estimate the simultaneous equations using
different instrumental variables for each equation in a dynamic panel framework.
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold. Firstly, it
combines the issue of the behavioral characteristics of different types of capital flows
raised in the 1970-1990 periods and the more recent issue of their impact on domestic
investment in the recipient countries. Secondly, the paper is different from previous
empirical studies in the following aspects. First, it considers the impact of uncertainty
on investment, but distinguishes whether the uncertainty is persistent or not. Because
the type of uncertainty matters, we consider it by decomposing uncertainty into
transitory and permanent components. Second, we consider that the imperfection of
financial markets in these countries may lead investors to explore other channels to
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pass through capital inflows. So we focus on specific potential sources of credit
market uncertainty: real interest rate uncertainty and uncertainty of credit availability.
Finally, we consider the possible different effect of each type of capital inflows on
domestic investment to see if there are important differences. Thirdly, up to our
knowledge, the subject of the study has been never addressed using GMM-3SLS
technique. The policy implications of this study is essential for macroeconomic policy
makers given that increasing capital mobility weakens the macroeconomic autonomy
via its potential effects on inflation, real exchange rate, and financial sector.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews the literature,
in section 3 we lay out the model, section 4 describes the data and the empirical
results, in section 5, we evaluate the model, and section 6 concludes.
1- Literature Review
Before analyzing the impact of capital flows on domestic investment in oil
producing economies, it is important to understand the interaction relationships
between domestic investment and each type of capital flows; FDI, FPI, and FBL.
From the recipient country view, capital inflows are seen as a way of filling gaps
between domestic saving, foreign exchange, and government revenue and skills from
one side and the planned resources needed to achieve development targets. FDI may
serve a stimulus to additional domestic investment; it may directly stimulate more
domestic investment if it is used to improve the country’s infrastructure 9Meier,
1995). FDI is an internalized investment flow (within the same MNC), which includes
capital assets as well as intangible assets. In FDI the investor derives benefits from its
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investment through increase in sales (on local market or export to third market),
reduction of costs of production, or increase in production efficiency of the group of
MNC subsidiaries. It is often asserted that FDI is one important channel through which
adoption and implementation of new technologies and ideas may take place. The new
introduced technologies may spillover from subsidiaries of MNC to domestic firms
(Findally 1978). The spillover may take place through technology imitation,
competition, backward and forward linkage through transaction between MNC and
domestic firms, and acquiring/upgrading new/existing skills (Sjoholm, 1999).
Foreign portfolio investment (FPI) is a purchase of securities (equities or bond)
issued by a company or government entity of a foreign country. Portfolio investment is
not accompanied by a transfer of intangible assets and management know-how and it
does not result in a loss of ownership. The prime motivations of FPI are yield seeking
and risk -reducing through portfolio diversification. Portfolio investment requires
well-functioning financial markets. An efficient financial system should perform three
functions; adequate mobilization of savings (including foreign savings); efficient
intermediation between investors and borrowers; efficient allocation of resources to
productive uses (UNCTAD, 1993). Having different types of institutions and
instruments, which responded to different risk/return, and time preferences of investor,
FPI is expected to help in further development of capital markets. As liquidity
increases, by FPI, turnover also increases and price volatility might be reduced, thus
inducing firms and investors to use capital markets to invest and raise funds through
issuing financial instruments. Also FPI enhances the standard of local capital markets
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by acquiring more quality of information and transparency. Moreover, FPI could also
stimulate the development of new institutions such as investment management and
financial advisory services, which improve and increase financial transactions
(UNCTAD, 1999). There could be many interactions between FDI and FPI. Through
backward and forward linkages FDI can encourage the creation or expansion of
domestic companies; which in turn would provide access to FPI for financing. In turn,
FPI enhances domestic capital markets and strengthen financial infrastructure, which
help to attract FDI and facilitate operations of MNC. On their impacts on
macroeconomy, it is often believed that the macroeconomic impact of FPI is higher
than of FDI, because FPI is not linked to any particular firm or sector. FPI not only
can just channel finance to investments, but also can exacerbate financial and exchange
rate crisis. In addition, the increase in local borrowing by MNCs’ subsidiaries brings
the risk of crowding out local firms from local capital markets.
Based on the existing empirical research on the determinants of investment in
developing countries, I have settled for a less structured approach. The empirical
literature on investment concludes three differing views of investment behavior. The
first model, actually the oldest one, is the theory of accelerator. It emphasizes the
proportionality between the stock of capital and output and links investment to the
rate of growth of output. The second one is the early version of neoclassical
investment model. It expands on the accelerator model by relating the optimal stock of
capital to the relative cost of capital as well as the level of output. The cost of capital
is a function of the price of capital goods, taxes, the rate of interest, and the
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depreciation. The third one and the most recent version, associated with Tobin,
Brainard, and others, focuses on the relationship between the market value of
additional investment and its replacement costs- the marginal q ratio- as a determinant
of investment. The use of q yields a well-defined investment relationship since it is
compatible with forward-looking expectation and also incorporates the adjustment
costs.
The ample relatively recent theoretical literature about the role played by
uncertainty in shaping the investment behavior (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) indicates the
importance of considering uncertainty in investment models, as we explained in the
Chapter I. It is well known that the combination between irreversibility and uncertainty
may have a substantial effect on the investment behavior (Chirinko, 1993). Theory
does not lead to any clear-cut conclusion about the impact of uncertainty on
investment, so that the importance of uncertainty is clearly an empirical matter. In
practice, most of the empirical research on investment in developing economies under
uncertainty has been driven rather ad hoc approaches that are influenced by the data
availability. A 1993 World Bank study (Rama, 1993) has surveyed a large number of
these studies. Our survey of these earlier studies of investment functions leads us to
formulate investment function as a function of capital inflows, output growth,
government expenditure, real exchange rate, inflation rate and a set of uncertainty
measures.
A comprehensive study by Bosworth and Collins (1999) provides evidence
concerning the effect of capital inflows on domestic investment for 58 developing
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countries during 1978-95. The authors distinguish among three different types of
inflows: FDI, portfolio investment, and other financial flows - primarily bank loans.
Both capital inflows and domestic investment are expressed as percentages of GDP.
They find that an increase of a dollar in capital inflows is associated with an increase in
domestic investment of about 50 cents. This result, however, masks significant
differences among types of inflow. FDI appears to bring about a one-for-one increase
in domestic investment; there is virtually no discernible relationship between portfolio
inflows and investment (little or no impact); and the impact of loans falls between
those of the other two. These results hold both for the 58-country sample and for a
subset of 18 emerging markets.
The study of each component of capital flow should matter. Lane and MilesiFerretti (2000) document that different types of capital flows have different properties
with regard features such as risk, liquidity, tradability, reversibility, and exportability
and tax treatment. FDI is connected with transfer of technology and entrepreneurial
skills whereas FPI may be useful in stimulating stock market development and
improvement, especially for developing countries. Compared with FBL, FDI and FPI
entail different risk sharing properties between domestic and foreign residents.
Public expenditure may have a complementary relationship with private
investment if that type of expenditure improves the productivity of private investment.
In this case, an increase in public spending leads to an increase in private investment.
However, public spending may “crowd-out” private investment if the relationship
between them is based on substitutability. The inclusion of government spending as an
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explanatory variable enables us to test the “crowding-out” hypothesis of government
spending.
While there is an extensive empirical literature on uncertainty and investment
(see the review in Carruth, Dickerson and Henley 2000), it is mainly undertaken on the
basis of one country or one indicator. Carruth et al. (2000) are of the view that broad
consensus is that the relationship is negative and this consensus emerges from a wide
range of models and alternative methods of proxying uncertainty. On the other hand,
Huizinga (1993) suggests that effects vary depending on the source of uncertainty. For
example, differing results for exchange rate volatility have been found by authors such
as Goldberg (1993) and Darby, Hughes Hallett, Irelands (1998) depending on the
countries studied and the data period used.
On the impacts of uncertainty of macroeconomic variables on the composition
of international capital flow the theory is silent. Sercu and Uppal (1998) analyze the
impact of exchange rate volatility on the trade volume between countries. In their
model the trade volume is the mirror of capital flows. They used a general equilibrium
stochastic endowment economy model with imperfect international commodity
markets to show that exchange rate uncertainty can either increase or decrease the
volume of trade depending on the source of the shock. They predict that an increase in
exchange rate uncertainty due to an increase in uncertainty of endowment process will
increase the volume of trade and thus a decrease in capital flows. When the source of
the shock to exchange rate uncertainty is due to an increase in market segmentation,
the increase in exchange rate uncertainty deteriorates the volume of trade and hence
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increase capital flows. However, Portes and Rey (2002) show that there is strong
empirical evidence that trade in financial markets is not a perfect substitute of trade in
goods. They also find that the “gravity” equation performs at least as well in
explaining asset trade as goods trade.
Recently, panel econometric methods have become popular in multi-country
macroeconomic studies. These methods, which have both a time series and cross
sectional dimension, are a means of increasing efficiency of parameter estimates when
testing a particular long run hypothesis. However when adopting this approach it is
important to test for cross sectional heterogeneity to ensure that panel estimates are
not biased due to unreasonable pooling of countries. Hechet, Razin and Shinar (2002)
explored econometrically the interaction between domestic investment and various
types of capital inflows using an international panel data set of 64 countries for the
period 1976-1997. They found an interaction especially in the FDI and loans inflows.
Also they found that the impact of FDI inflows on domestic investment is a bit weaker
than previously suggested in the literature, which was plagued, by the endogeneity and
non-stationarity problems. Still, the FDI inflows are ranked at the top, compared to the
other types of capital inflows in terms of its impact on domestic investment. Since
considering uncertainty in the interaction between capital inflows and domestic
investment may alter the directional relationship, including the effect of uncertainty in
the model becomes important. This paper will address the issue of uncertainty and its
effect on the interaction between various types of capital inflows and investment. Also
the endogeneity problem is addressed in this paper. Accordingly, we estimate the
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effect of FDI inflows, portfolio inflows and loan inflows, jointly on domestic
investment, with also the reversed effect of domestic investment on these three types
of inflows, using a Two-Stage Least Squares estimation technique.
On the source of uncertainty, there has been some recent work emphasizes that
the source of uncertainty matters. In assessing the real impact of uncertainty, Baum et
al. (2001) explained the importance of separating transitory from permanent volatility.
Chadha and Samo (2002) provide evidence of a differential impact of price uncertainty
on investment, depending upon whether the uncertainty is long run or short run, with
short run volatility being most damaging. Developing from these strands of work, we
investigate the impact of permanent versus transitory component of oil price
uncertainty on investment and capital inflows using the methods of Engle and Lee
(1999).
2- Model and Econometric Specification
The model is based on four simultaneous equations, one for domestic
investment and one for each type of capital flows. The modal to be estimated takes the
form:
lit = O i+ailin + a2FDIit + a3FBLit + OtFPL + a5DCit +a<>RR;t + a 7RPKjt +agGGDPit+

oeGGDPiu + a7Tit +<XgGit +a9<Jit+uut

( 1)

FDIjt =Pi+ Pi FDIit.i + P2L + P3GGDPit+ p4GGDPjt.i + p5Tit + p6Git + P? a* + u2it

(2)

FBL;t= Yi+ Yi FBL it.i + y 2 1« + y 3GGDPit + Y4 G G DPin+ YsWI,+ y6 a it + u3it

(3)

FPL =5i+ SiFPIin + § 2lit + 5 3GGDPit+ 84GGDPin + 8 sWIt+ Sgau + U4it.

(4)
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In each equation the constant has subscript / to represent the part of the behavioral
relationship containing time invariant variables that differ substantially from one
country to another (fixed effect). We assume that the error terms are homoscedastic
and serially uncorrelated. Also errors are allowed to be contemporaneously correlated
to exploit the joint information in the system.
In the equation (1), I use a simple empirical specification for investment function
relating domestic investment (la) as a percentage of GDP to its lag, each type of capital
flow, a set of standard investment determinants, and a set of uncertainty measures( oa).
Each type of capital flow, Foreign Direct Investment (FDIa), Foreign Portfolio
Investment (FPIa), and Foreign Bank Loan (FBLa) was expressed as a percent of GDP.
Among Standard investment variables, I include the current and lagged levels o f the log
of real GDP to capture the accelerator effect, the user cost of capital (relative price of
capital goods measured by the log of investment deflator to GDP deflator, and the real
interest rate (Serven, 1998)). In theory as explained in Chapter I, the two variables of
user cost should have a negative effect on investment. However, in the presence of
credit market imperfection (interest control, non-price rationing mechanisms in
developing countries), interest rate may not have a decisive role in investment and
become uninformative as a true marginal cost of funds. So we need a variable that
reflects the overall tightness of credit market. Empirical studies suggest a proxy relating
the flow of domestic credit to nominal GDP (Serven 1998). Indeed this variable has been
used in several empirical researches to reflect the degree of financial development also.
The uncertainty surrounding the access to credit may exert a negative impact on
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investment. Hence, not only is the credit flow to GDP important to reflect credit market
imperfection but also the uncertainty of credit flow. One should expect a positive effect
by the former and negative by the latter on investment. The tax policy (T) and
government expenditure are included to show how policy variable affect domestic
investment and FDI. To the previous determinants, I added the measures of
macroeconomic uncertainty, which includes inflation uncertainty, exchange rate
uncertainty, real interest rate uncertainty, Credit uncertainty, and short run and long run
uncertainty of oil prices. I used the conditional variance of the innovations to these
variables of interest as obtained from both GARCH and CGARCH procedures, because
they are closest in spirit to the notion of uncertainty as discussed in Chapter II. The
exogenous variables used is the o vector of uncertainty measure include inflation
uncertainty (INFU), exchange rate uncertainty (EXU), credit uncertainty (CU), real
interest rate uncertainty (RRU), short run oil price uncertainty (SROIL), and Long run
oil price uncertainty (LROIL).
Equation (2) shows factors that determine FDI. The extensive literature on FDI
consists of three main models. The so-called OLI identifies the attractiveness of a
country for FDI on the basis of ownership, location and internalization (Dunning, 1993).
The gravity model attempts to predict FDI on the basis of macroeconomic factors such
as the level of GDP, GDP growth and the population size (Brock, 1998). The
transaction costs model, which try to determine the most suited investment mode based
on cost structure (Buckley and Casson, 1981). Our specification for FDI is closest to
gravity model. In addition to a lag of FDI and domestic investment, we include GDP
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and GDP growth to reflect the market size and we expect that would have a positive
effect on FDI. Also we include the set of uncertainty variables mentioned above.
Equation (3) and (4) specify the FPI and FBL flows. The economic theory
suggests several factors (external and internal) that explain the FPI and FBL flows. In
addition to lag of FPI and FBL and domestic investment which capture the interaction,
we include GDP growth rate and its lag to reflect improvements in economic
fundamentals, world interest rate (WI) to mark favorable global macroeconomic
conditions, and total credit as a percentage of GDP to reflect the development in capital
markets. To the previous variables, we added the same set of macroeconomic
uncertainty. In addition to the interactions between domestic investment and each type
of capital flows, the purpose of the model is to show the impact of some macroeconomic
uncertainty on the capital flows as well as on domestic investment. So that in order to
focus directly on the problem, we do not include explicitly into the model a number of
issues related to underdeveloped infrastructure, bureaucracy or widespread corruption,
and political risk, which are undoubtedly taken into account in the process of capital
flow.
To estimate the system we discuss some methodological issues. We consider a
four simultaneous equation models (SEM) to assess the interaction among domestic
investment and each type of capital inflows as mentioned above. It is well known that
estimating a SEM using OLS and GLS will be inconsistent. We could apply single
equation methods to each of them like 2SLS, but we will exploit the joint information
of all the system variables to improve the efficiency. Wooldridge (1996) explained that
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a SEM with measurement error in some exogenous variables, or with some omitted
variables correlated with what would be exogenous variables, can also be estimated as
a system of equations if different instruments are valid for different equations. He
offered a set of regularity condition under which the nonlinear three stage least squares
estimator is the asymptotically efficient GMM estimator. One of the conditions to get
an efficient GMM estimator is to use the optimal weighting matrix. The system of
three-stage least square (3SLS) estimator is a GMM estimator that uses a particular
weighting matrix based on the assumption that the conditional variance of the error
given the instruments is constant. Under the identification conditions and a certain
assumption about the weighting matrix, GMM-3SLS is an efficient GMM estimate and
is consistent. It is also known as the Full-Information Instrumental Variables (FIV)
estimator (Hayashi, 2000). In general the GMM-3SLS is preferred because it is more
efficient and allows for using different instruments for different equations. In our study
different instruments are used for each different equation.
Our sets of instruments are composed of common and unique instruments for
each equation. Each equation has at least one unique instrument that is the second lag
of the first difference of the dependent variable. If possible, we also use other unique
instruments for each equation. In addition to the second lag of the first difference of
the dependent variable, we use the following instruments for each equation. For
domestic investment, equation (1), we use a constant and one lag of the differences of
FDI, FPI, and FBL, tax revenues, government expenditure, and three lags of the
differences of GGDP. As another unique instrument, we used degree of openness,
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measured by the sum of export and imports divided by GDP. This instrument is highly
correlated with each type of capital flow because it implies that capital flows can move
more freely and at a lower cost between countries but is not correlated to the error.
For foreign direct investment, equation (2), we use a constant and the lagged
first difference of domestic investment, income tax rates, government expenditure, and
three lagged differences of GGDP. For a unique instrument we also use the number of
fixed telephone lines in each country. This instrument is an indicator to infrastructure
development, communications and information technology in the host countries and it
is correlated with domestic investment and FDI but not correlated with the error. For
Foreign bank loans, equation (3), we use constant and lagged differences of domestic
investment, world interest rate, and three lagged differences of GGDP. For foreign
portfolio investment, equation (3) we use a constant and lagged differences of
domestic investment, world interest rate, and three lagged differences of GGDP. In
addition to the AFPI^ as a unique instrument, we use total credit/ GDP ratio as
another instrument. This ratio is a sign of financial market breadth in these countries
and it is highly correlated with domestic investment and FPI and orthogonal to the
error.
3-

Data and Empirical Findings

Our data covers 13 countries of oil producing countries. The data spans from
1981 to 2003. There are two kinds of data on foreign direct investment provided by
IMF, net and gross foreign direct investment. Net foreign direct investment refers to
inflows net of outflows while the gross refers only to inflows, that is, foreign direct
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investment into the country. Also OECD statistics provide FDI originated in OECD
member countries into developing countries (Geographical Distribution of Financial
Flows to developing Countries). The main source of the data is WDI CD-Rom and
IFS IMF CD-Rom. We construct private investment (domestic investment % of GDP)
by removing government investment from total investment. We obtain government
investment from Government Finance Statistics of the IMF (GFS). It consists of
outlays on additions to the fixed assets of the economy plus net changes in the level of
inventories. Fixed assets include land improvements, plant, machinery, and equipment
purchases. The construction of roads, railways, and the like, include commercial and
industrial buildings, offices, schools, hospitals, and private residential dwellings.
Inventories are stocks of goods held by firms to meet temporary or unexpected
fluctuations in production or sales, see WDI tables 1.4 and 4.9. Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI), net inflows (% of GDP). It is the sum of equity capital,
reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short term capital as shown in
the balance of payments, see WDI table 5.1. Foreign Portfolio Investment (FPI),
excluding portfolio investment excluding liabilities constituting foreign authorities'
reserves (LCFAR) covers transactions in equity securities and debt securities. Data are
in current U.S. dollars. Foreign Bank Loans (FBL) or Bank and trade-related lending
data cover commercial bank lending and other private credits. Data are in current U.S.
dollars. For more information, see WDI table 6.7. Each type of capital inflows is
measured as a proportion of GDP. The average share of real government consumption
in real GDP measures government consumption expenditure. GDP growth is measured
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in annual %. It seems more appropriate to use gross data since we are interested in the
benefits that capital inflows may have in the host country via increasing loanable funds,
transfer of knowledge and other spillover effects. Also this is consistent with other
studies see (Borensztein, De Gregorio, and Lee 1993). Our panels are unbalanced,
with the sample restricted to oil producing countries that have a minimum of 10
observations and have monthly data to construct uncertainty measures for other
macroeconomic variables we mentioned in Chapter II.
Table 1 shows the results of GMM-3SLS estimation for domestic investment
function using conditional volatility of nominal exchange rate (EXU), consumer price
(INFU), real interest rate (RRU), and total credit (CU) estimated using GARCH. Also,
transitory (SROILU) versus permanent (LROILU) uncertainty of the log difference of
oil price estimated by CGARCH are included, as set out in Chapter n. In column 1
Table 1 a one percent increase in FDI as a percent of GDP is followed by 0.52 percent
increase in future domestic investment as a percent of GDP in oil producing countries.
We notice that the foreign direct investment and lagged domestic investment have a
similar impact on domestic investment. A one percent increase in either FDI or
domestic investment will increases current or future domestic investment as a percent
of GD by about 0.55 % respectively. To understand what is driving these results, we
have to decompose total domestic investment into private and public domestic
investment and see the effect. It has been cited in the empirical studies that the FDI has
no effect of public investment in developed countries and in the short run in
developing countries and it does in the long run, however it has a strong effect of
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private investment in both group of countries (McMillan, 1999). Unfortunately, for
most of the countries in the sample the breakdown into private and public domestic
investment is not available. However, when we look at the effect of lagged FDI on
domestic investment, we find that its impact is more than one and half times the impact
of lagged domestic investment on domestic investment. For example a 1% increase in
FDI as a percent of GDP increases the following years’ domestic investment as a
percent of GDP by 0.88 %. This explains the spillover effect of FDI on private
investment specifically and on total investment in general. Also it shows the
importance of FDI as a vehicle to transfer technology.
Foreign bank lending, the second type of capital flows carries significant
coefficient, but its impact on domestic investment is much less than FDI. A 1 %
increase in foreign bank lending as a percent of GDP increases domestic investment as
a percent of GDP by 0.13 %. The foreign portfolio investment has no significant
impact on domestic investment. The reason for that is most of these countries has
inefficient financial institutions or not developed yet. On the other side, the estimated
coefficients on the standard investment determinants appear reasonable and have their
expected signs. GDP and credit availability have a positive and significant impact on
investment, while the opposite applies to the real interest rate (insignificant) and
relative price of capital. In turn, most of uncertainty proxies have strong significant
impact on domestic investment. Interestingly, short run oil price uncertainty has a
negative and more destructive effect on investment than long run uncertainty, which
has a positive impact on investment. One interpretation of the positive sign of long run

89

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

uncertainty on investment is that an increase in uncertainty may increase the value of a
marginal unit of capital and, ceteris paribus, increase the incentive to invest. Also
increased volatility may raise the required rate of return before investment will be
undertaken. On the other hand short run uncertainty has a negative effect on
investment because short run uncertainty combined with the irreversibility will induce
wait and see behavior which results in postponing investment. Exchange rate and
inflation uncertainty both carries significant and negative coefficients. The magnitude
of inflation uncertainty is larger than the magnitude of exchange rate. This highlights
the importance of controlling inflation to have investment boost. Overall, these results
in broad agreement with results reported by some earlier studies (Serven and
Solimano, 1993; Darby et al, 1998)
Though, the real interest rate is insignificant, the real interest rate uncertainty is
significant. Also, the credit availability coefficient is significant and has a small impact
on investment. However, the uncertainty surrounding credit availability is highly
significant (negative) and has a larger impact. The significant effect of total credit and
insignificant effect of real interest rate is a remarkable. It means that investment in
these countries is more driven by quantity rather than price effects stemming from
financial market. As we indicated in the theoretical part in Chapter I, the informational
asymmetries in capital market combined with uncertainty have a depressing effect on
investment while the effect on the real interest rate is indeterminate. This explains why
real interest rate is significant. The quantity of credits rather than the costs may be
more binding in developing economies because of credit rationing and lack of well-
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functioning financial markets. Credit constraint is likely to be more important, partly
because the quantity of financial resources is limited due to the lack of equity financing
instruments. Moreover, controls over interest rates and credit rationing in the financial
markets in most of oil producing countries reduce the role of the cost of capital
(proxied by real the interest rate). The role of financial development in oil producing
countries is highly significant which suggests the importance of improving these
markets to attract investment. However, the effect of uncertainty in credit market
dampens the effect of financial development and this may explain why the real interest
rate is insignificant. Fiscal policy in oil producing counties plays an important role in
affecting investment. Both taxes and government expenditure carry significant
coefficients. A 1% increase in government expenditure as a percent of GDP increases
investment by 0.09%, while taxes decrease the investment by 0.19 %.
Next we consider the effect of domestic investment and uncertainty on foreign
capital flows. The last three columns in table 1 show how each type of capital flows
reacts to domestic investment and other variables. While the domestic investment has a
veiy small impact on FDI, a 1% increase in domestic investment as a percent of GDP
stimulates 0.008 % in FDI as a percent of GDP; it has no significant effect on the other
type of capital flows. This is an expected result since financial market in thee countries
are not well developed and some of these countries put some restrictions on the
foreigners’ ownership. We noticed that there is no interaction among the three types of
capital flows; each one is independent from the other. However, for each type of
^ capital flows the lagged of the variable itself was highly significant which means an
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increase in FDI, FBL, and FPI by 1 % will increase each type by 0.58%, 0.78%, and
0.13% in the future, respectively. Certainly, the initial level in each country is an
important point in assessing capital flows sustainability. Also, fiscal policy has no
significant impact on capital flows. Interestingly, the total domestic credit has a
positive and significant impact on FBL. This may suggest strategic complementarities
between foreign lenders and domestic credit market. An increase in domestic credit
conveys a signal to foreign lenders to increase their lows. In fact developing countries
do not need this kind of relation because they do need FBL in the periods where
expanding domestic credit is policy problematic, they need FBL as a substitute source
of finance. Of course, the world interest rate is the most influential variable in
stimulating FBL and FPI and our results confirm that in oil producing countries. World
interest rate carries significant coefficients for FBL and FPI. A 1% increase in world
interest rate increases FBL by 0.05%, while decreases FPI by 0.2% as a percent of
GDP.
The effect of uncertainty on capital flows is different for each type. Inflation
uncertainty has no impact on FBL and FPI but it has a significant impact (negative) on
FDI. Foreign exchange rate uncertainty has a significant impact (negative) on FDI;
however it has no impact on FBL and FPI. Both real interest rate and uncertainty
surrounding it have no significant impact on any type of capital flows. Credit
uncertainty has significant impact (negative) only on FBL. Again, this result confirms
the strategic complementarities between foreign lenders and domestic credit market.
The foreign lenders look at the domestic credit market before providing loans.
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Permanent and transitory uncertainties of oil prices affect both foreign direct
investment and foreign portfolio investment. The effects of short run uncertainty on
FDI and FPI are larger than the effect of long run uncertainty and both reduce FDI and
FPI. However, the short run uncertainty of oil price increases the FBL. One possible
explanation for this result is most of FBL are short-lived in nature. It actually seeks for
higher interest rate, which will be high considering risk premium, associated with the
short run oil price uncertainty in these countries. On the other hand, long run oil price
uncertainty carries significant coefficient and expected sign (negative).
4-

Model Evaluation

To evaluate the model, we look at the model’s prediction against historical
data using actual values for both exogenous and the lagged endogenous variables of
the model. For doing so, we have employed static deterministic simulation. This
simulation is typically used to produce a set of one-step ahead forecast over the
historical data so as to examine the historical fit of the model. In static solution of the
model, values of the endogenous variables up to the previous period are used each
time when the model is solved and lagged endogenous variables are based on the
actual values. A static solution can not be used to predict more than one observation
into the fixture.
The results of one-step ahead forecast for each endogenous variable are shown
in figures 3-1, 3-2, 3-3, and 3-4. For domestic investment, the substantial year-to-year
swings in investment are one of the features of investment series in most countries.
These swings drive the business cycle and therefore will affect on most of other
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macroeconomic variables. We can say that the model fits fairly well the domestic
investment in most countries. The model quite predicts the smooth changes in
investment but it fails to predict sharp fluctuations. For example, the 1993 peak in
Egypt, Kuwait in 1996, Nigeria in 1994, the 1994-drop in investment in Iran, and the
1989-drop in Tunisia are not predicted well by the model. A possible explanation for
that could be the reluctance associated with implementing privatization and other
program of economic reforms in most of the countries which started in late of 1980s
and still in progress.
For capital inflows, when we examined FDI, FBL, and FPI charts in figures 32, 3-3, and 3-4, we generally notice that the model predicts quite well the path of FDI
and FBL and little for FPI. In 1992 most countries in the sample endured a decline in
both FDI and FPI and we would say this caused the peak in domestic investment. The
high-rise in FDI in Saudi Arabia in 1989 and FDI swings in Tunisia are not well fitted.
The high rise in FDI in Saudi Arabia in 1989 was a result of government’s
encouragement in petrochemical industry after the sharp decline in oil prices in the
second half of 1980s. FDI swings in Tunisia were mainly due to the uncertainty akin to
the economic reform program. However for the rest of the sample FDI and FBL are
well fitted.
For foreign bank loans, the model predicts the changes fairly well and we can
generally render much of the simulation uncertainty to the large residual in investment
equation, which is creating a lot of variation in investment and foreign direct
investment as we mentioned above.
94

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

For foreign portfolio investment, the model fits well for Algeria, Venezuela,
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Indonesia, and Egypt but not very much for the rest of
the sample. One possible explanation for that is most of these countries are classified
as emerging markets and they may be affected by institutional factors such as financial
infra structure and development of other financial intuitions which are not included in
the model.
5- Conclusion
This paper has developed an empirical model to analyze the interactions
between capital flows and domestic investment under different macroeconomic
sources of uncertainty. The model is applied on a set of oil producing countries using
GMM-3SLS in a SEM framework. Having evaluated the model, I conclude that the
interaction exists at least for foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment and
foreign bank lending are the effective components in capital flows to stimulate
domestic investment in oil producing countries. FDI is the strongest catalyst in capital
flows for domestic investment. The interaction between FDI and domestic investment
is bi-direction, however FDI induces domestic investment more than domestic
investment stimulates FDI. The dynamics shows that the lagged FDI has a stronger
impact on domestic investment than the lagged of domestic investment itself. This
suggests that FDI, by bringing technological and capabilities, induces domestic
investment and makes it more profitable. FBL is the second important component in
capital flows stimulating domestic investment but its impact is much less than FDI.
Both domestic investment and all types of capital flows are affected by short run and
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long run uncertainty of oil prices. However, the effect of short run uncertainty is much
larger than long run. Uncertainty combined with the capital market imperfection has a
negative effect on domestic investment. The negative effects exerted by uncertainty
dampen the positive effects on investment due to financial development and this may
explain why the real interest rate is not significant.
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CHAPTER IV
CAPITAL FLOWS AND MACROECONOMIC POLICY RESPONSE:
SIMULATIONS FROM THE EGYPTIAN ECONOMY
The rationale for forecasting is to develop a view of future economic
developments and to identify and correct undesirable trends. The goal of the forward
looking economic policy is to anticipate events well before they actually occur. The
economic forecast generally is the solid ground on which strategic policy initiatives
can be implemented and this forms the framework of managing small open economy.
Among other economic forecasts, the capital flows and its interaction with the
domestic investment is one of major interests for economic policy makers. Developing
and developed countries have never shared such a strong interest in ensuring the stable
growth of international capital flows. Both north and south are trying to benefit from
the recovery now underway in the global economy, which coincides with a resurge in
financial flows to developing countries (World Bank, 2004). The main challenge for
policymakers is to find a way to translate these gains into investments that promote
development. Having upturned capital flows in 2003 from the subdued levels of the
past five years, the movements of international capital flows- whether in or out- can
have significant macroeconomic consequences. In the last decade, the macroeconomic
distress and other macroeconomic problem such exchange rate crises in emerging
markets have confirmed again the need for appropriate policies to handle international
capital flows. Moreover, the cost of poor policy design will increase as involving with
a world of increasingly integrated financial market.
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These premises apply to the oil producing countries for which the accession to
the world economy is inevitable. Some of these countries have already experienced
substantial capital flows and the likely course of future events will further increase
their importance. Accession countries have implemented the reforms and adopt the
policies necessary to comply with the globalization and a functioning market economy.
Many of those economies have already liberalized capital account transactions
substantially and removed most of capital controls while others have an interim period
to do so. The increasingly exposure to capital flows recalls the problems associated
with it. How this was linked to the other macroeconomic policies pursued is one of the
principal questions I try to resolve.
The overheating threat associated with large capital flows evokes a policy
response from policymakers. The magnitude, sequencing, and the timing of policy
response should be based on the factors driving these inflows and the recipient
country’s objectives. Abetter understanding of these issues is important because
developing countries are responsible in part for the causes and consequences of capital
flows. As World Bank Report (2004) indicates, the recovery in private flows was
encouraged, in part, by structural improvements in the developing countries and the
extent to which the recipient countries harness and benefit from capital flows depends
on the policy coping and handling these flows.
There are many approaches of obtaining economic forecasts, qualitative and
quantitative. Judgmental or non-extrapolative forecasting is an example of the
qualitative method in which an individual or small group of people makes assessments
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of likely future conditions. To the extent to which experienced persons are involved,
the technique can produce very good forecasts, however, judgmental approach can be
subject to bias and other sources of error (Guajardo and Miranda, 2000). Two general
methods of quantitative forecasting models exist. One is a time series approach that
consists of large number of techniques that generally assume that history provides a
good guide to future events. The other method of quantitative forecasting, more
complex, is the econometric models. While still incorporating time series data, these
models construct causal model. Once the model is estimated, the parameters can be
employed to generate forecasts of the variable given their explanatory variables.
In this chapter econometric model is employed. Based on our estimated model
in the previous study (Chapter m ), we simulate the effects of policy options facing oil
producing countries as they continue along the path to integrate with the global
economy. The model is used to explore the consequences of sterilized intervention,
fiscal policy and stabilizations policy proposed by international economist on capital
inflows and domestic investment. The rest of the chapter discusses the macroeconomic
effects of capital flows, the problems they create, and the policy responses to enjoy the
benefits of capital mobility while mitigating the costs in the second section. The third
section, provide the simulation technique used in the study and presents the simulation
results. The last section provides concluding remarks.
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1- The Macroeconomics of Capital Flows
1.1 Causes of Capital Flows
The diagnosis of the causes of capital inflows will help determine the
appropriate response. Factors driving capital inflows can be categorized in the
following categories; pull factors; push factors, and financial integration and
globalization. In general, pull factors are the factors that generate an abrupt change
between domestic saving and investment, which in turn triggers capital inflows. Pull
factors include political and economic reforms that boost confidence in the economy,
debt restructuring to reduce the debt overhang and enhance the foreign exchange
inflows, proliferation of specific incentives and simplification of the procedures for
foreign direct and portfolio investment, liberalization of foreign exchange market, and
dismantling the restrictions on private sector foreign borrowing(Gooptu, 1994),.
Push factors or external factors, which affect an economy directly. Among
push factors, the lower rates of return on assets in lending countries. This happens in
response to cyclical factors that deteriorate the risk-retum characteristics of assets
issued by developed countries (Agenor and Montiel, 1999). We might call it external
financial shock. Of course this temporary shock may be reversed because of its cyclical
origin that represents a threat to recipient countries. Even we assume the shock will
last, the benefits from it will depend on the recipient country’s conditions. More
capital will flow to countries that had been credit constrained and remain heavily
indebted (Edward, 2000). The second main push factors are the portfolio
diversification preferences combined with the changes in financial structure in capital100
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exporting countries. Due to either the increased role of mutual or pension hinds as
financial intermediaries or information technologies, developed countries favor lending
to emerging economies. Flows driven by this factor are likely to sustain for an
extended period of time. The policy questions about push factors are, is it optimal to
consider the probability of capital flows reversal driven by the first reason? Or/and
how the policy copes with the sustainability implication that the second reason might
have?
Financial integration and globalization are most recent factors that drive capital
inflows. The upturn of capital flows may reflect increased financial integration either as
a result of policy choices in both developed and developing countries, such as capital
account liberalization and removing barriers impeding cross border capital flows or
due to advances in technology affecting information costs. Also, capital inflows may
reflect structural distortions in domestic capital markets and easier access to global
markets. When global access is increased as an act of policy, domestic residents
exploit the comparative advantage that foreign capital markets enjoy. Also, successful
development of domestic capital markets may eventually mitigate the need to rely to
heavily on foreign capital. Permanent reliance on foreign capital remains relatively
rare. Economists have spent three decades trying to explain the Feldstein-Horioka
puzzle for developed economies: national saving and national investment are much
more highly correlated than perfect global capital mobility would imply which casts
doubt about capital mobility.
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1.2 Capital Flows and Policy Responses
Attracting capital flows is a mixed blessing and the trouble associated with
them is well known for policy makers. Therefore, the appropriate policy to deal with
them need to be investigated. On one hand, capital flows have led to increase financial
integration for individual countries. Capital flows boost growth in developing
countries by financing investment, smooth consumption, and allows international
borrowing to offset the temporary decline in income. On the other hand, the excessive
expansion in aggregate demand implied by capital flows may have negative effects on
macroeconomic indicator in general and on financial sector specifically.
In this section examines the mechanisms through which these consequences
happen. Open macroeconomic models predict that the main macroeconomic challenge
posed by the arrival of capital inflows is the possibility of having excessive aggregate
demand caused by exchange rate appreciation and domestic inflation. This problem,
called “overheating”, works through the following mechanism. With a fixed nominal
exchange rate, a large increase in capital inflows is likely to create an overall surplus in
balance of payments (Montiel 2000). To avoid the nominal appreciation, due to the
surplus, the central bank intervenes to buy the excess supply of foreign currency at the
prevailing exchange rate. This would result in an expansion in monetary base which
would ignite the aggregate demand and domestic price level. With the fixed exchange
rate and rising domestic prices, the real exchange rate will be appreciated. Having this
circle, the policy intervention can be achieved at many points along the transmission
track to break this causal chain (Montiel, 2000).
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Adjustment to capital flows is a policy issues for many reasons. First:
International financial markets are incomplete, and the risk generated by its volatility
can not be insured. Second: International financial markets are subject to fads, bubbles,
or contagion effects, in which international investors make sudden reversions for an
economy that may be unwarranted by underlying fundamentals. Third: Distortion in
product market and imperfection in domestic financial market make the process of
adjustment to capital flows suboptimal. Fourth: Sudden shifts in capital flows may
interfere with the effectiveness of other government policies such as price stability and
managing aggregate demand. These considerations raise many related policy
questions. For example: Should fiscal policy expand or contract when capital flows
become more scare? What exchange-rate regime provides a better adjustment to sharp
changes in capital flows? Can the policy turn at reducing the uncertain environment
within which domestic investment and capital flows operate affect the interaction
between them?
Accordingly, policy intervention can be classified as follows: policies that
accept the reserve accumulation associated with a balance of payment surplus, but
attempt to improve its effects on the monetary base (sterilized intervention); policies
that accept an increase in the base, but attempt to restraints effects on broader
monetary aggregates. Increases in reserve requirements and quantitative credit
restrictions are example of such policy; Policies that accept a monetary expansion, but
attempt to offset expansionary effects on aggregate demand that could result in
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inflation and/or real exchange rate appreciation (fiscal contraction). We will discuss
each policy in details in the following section.
Sterilization policy: To illustrate how the Intervention and sterilization work,
we use two identities. First, the balance of payments identity which implies that the
sum of the current (CA) and the capital account balance (CAP) equals the change in
the (net) foreign assets of the central bank (AFA).
CA + CAP = AFA

(1)

Assume that the current account is balanced (CA = 0) at the prevailing exchange rate
(holding everything else constant). For any reason, assume there is a tendency for
capital inflows in a foreign currency (U.S. dollars). This puts pressure on the exchange
rate to appreciate. If the local central bank wants to prevent currency appreciation, it
will intervene in the foreign exchange market by purchasing U.S. dollars, thus
increasing its holding of foreign assets. The outcome is positive capital inflows and an
increase in foreign assets (CAP > 0, AFA > 0). If the central bank does not intervene,
the exchange rate will appreciate freely to the point where it is unprofitable for capital
to flow in. In this case, balance of payments equilibrium is achieved with CAP = 0 and
AFA= 0. From the preceding we can say changes in foreign assets of the central bank
reflect the balance of payments conditions of a country and its exchange rate policies.
Second, the central bank balance sheet implies that a change in reserve money (AH),
or the (monetary) liabilities of the central bank, is identically equal to the change in its
assets, which in turn equals the sum of changes in domestic credit (DC) and in foreign
assets (FA) of the central bank.
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AH= ADC + AFA.

(2)

Equation (2) implies that a change in foreign assets tends to change the supply of
money. The policy attempts to prevent changes in foreign assets from affecting reserve
money by implementing offsetting changes in domestic credit, is known as sterilization.
For example, Asian countries in the 1980s and 1990s responded to large increases in
foreign asset holdings by implementing sharp reductions in domestic credit (Moreno,
1995). In deed many countries have begun to divert a larger share of their capital
inflows to reserve accumulation in order to safeguard against sudden capital outflows
(World Bank, 2002). The consequences of such policy have been that a smaller
fraction of capital inflows is being channeled into domestic investment. Sterilization
can also work the other way. In 1994, the Mexican central bank offset the monetary
contraction caused by declining foreign asset holdings by increasing domestic credit.
Of course, the extent to which balance of payment disequilibria will arise and be
reflected in changes in foreign assets depends in part on the degree of capital mobility
and on the exchange rate regime in the other part (Kahler, 1998).
Exchange rate regime: Most of developing countries that received large capital
inflows during the first half of 1990s resisted the nominal exchange rate appreciation
induced by capital inflows. The rationales behind that were the commitments of the
country to maintain fixed exchange rate, to delay the real appreciation in order to
maintain international competitiveness, or the perception that the capital flows are
volatile and temporary in nature. However, as the inflows persisted and reserves
accumulated this policy became costly. As a result, exposure to market forces is
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resorted either by revaluation or allowing more flexibility in exchange rate
determination. The exchange rate regime here played a major role in determining the
pattern of balance of payments adjustment to sudden shocks in capital inflows. Under
floating exchange rates with no intervention the nominal exchange rate will appreciate
freely in response to capital flows. However, under an official commitment to a peg,
crawling, or narrow band exchange regime, a decision to revaluate will be necessary.
There are several advantages of allowing exchange rate to appreciate: any shock to the
capital acc during the periods of large capital inflows (Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart,
1994). First, such appreciation will bring (AFA=0) so will insulate money supply (AH)
and domestic credit (ADC) from the inflows, which is particularly desirable if the
inflows are perceived to be highly reversible. Second, if the economic fundamentals
support the real appreciation, then the adjustment will be by real appreciation not via
domestic inflation. Despite these advantages, revaluations have been relatively
uncommon in response to capital flows. Under flexible exchange rates with
intervention (more realistic), the amount of reserve accumulation is a policy choice.
The more aggressive is the reserve accumulation, the more thoroughly will the
authorities insulate the nominal exchange rate from pressures generated by the capital
flows. We should note that under both fixed and flexible exchange rates, the current
account would adjust to a sustained capital inflow by two mechanisms. First: the
inflows will generally create a reduction in domestic interest rates and an increase in
asset prices, thus promoting an increase in expenditure relative to production. This
happens under fixed exchange rate as liquidity and bank lending increase._Second: the
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inflows will also create pressures for real exchange rate appreciation either under fixed
or flexible exchange rate. However, under fixed exchange rate the appreciation may
take a long time because it will be created by domestic inflation while under flexible
exchange rate the appreciation will be due to nominal exchange rate appreciation.
Fiscal policy: policymakers may react to capital by flowing tighten fiscal policy
by either reducing expenditures or increasing taxes, or both. In theory, the
contractionary fiscal policy can lower aggregate demand and then offset the
expansionary influence by capital inflows. This policy has several advantages. It avoids
the costs associated with the sterilization policies. In addition, fiscal restraint is a
substitute for exchange rate flexibility as a stabilization device. A cut in government
expenditure is likely to limit the appreciation of the real exchange rate since non
tradable goods often represent a significant share of government expenditure (IMF,
1997). However, the devil in the details of how the fiscal gap is closed (Calvo et al,
1994). For instance, an adverse shock in capital flows often implies a sharp decrease in
the availability of real resources (non-inflationary) to finance the fiscal deficits and the
contractionary impacts of such shock exacerbate the fiscal deficits.
Beyond the two edged sword of fiscal policy as an instrument for stabilization,
some economists argue that fiscal policy should become more conservative in the face
increased financial integration (Heller, 1997, the World Bank, 1997). As the country
increasingly integrates with the global economy, the direction and magnitude of capital
flows become very sensitive to perception of domestic solvency. If the long-run fiscal
policy is uncertain, short-run changes will be used as a signal on the government’s
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long run intentions. This limits the flexibility of the fiscal policy in the short run
because the government will be concerned about the possibility of giving the wrong
signals. Therefore, achieving a reputation for conservative fiscal policy will maximize
the short-run policy flexibility in face of capital inflows periods (Lopez-Mejia, 1997).
The fiscal response to such shock and generally to manage volatile capital
flows is to set precautionary fiscal targets or decrease government spending but this
one has many political problems. Also it has been discussed that it would be desirable
to offset the contractionary impact of a sudden reduction in capital flows with a
countercyclical fiscal expansion but the scarcity of non-inflationary resources
potentially creates the need for a pro-cyclical fiscal contraction instead. Generally,
there are practical limits to what should be expected of fiscal policy: it is highly
unlikely that any government will react properly either in the magnitude or the speed
required to offset the shifts in the capital flows. Also, the debate that precedes the
approval to use fiscal tolls makes it inflexible instruments (Lipschitz et al, 2001)
2-

Model Simulation

In this section, we use the model developed and estimated in Chapter HI to
simulate the results under different policy options. It is better to discuss first the
simulation methodology, the different types of simulation, and how simulation works.
Simulation refers to data generating by the use of a computer, which simulates
results of an experiment. In economics the experimenter cannot use the actual
economy and its environment to perform an experiment. Economists instead create the
experimental situation in a computer and generate data, which are believed to have the
108
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characteristics similar to data obtained from an actual experiment. In econometrics,
simulations are used to generate artificial economic data from an econometric model,
which is a set of equations describing an economy or parts thereof (Chow, 1983).
Once the econometric model is estimated using actual economic data, we can study its
dynamic properties by simulation and see how it responds to different shocks.
Deterministic Simulations: In this simulation, all equations in the model are
solved so that they hold without error (deterministic relations) during the simulation
period, all coefficients are held fixed at their point estimates, and all exogenous
variables are held constant. The deterministic simulation results depend on the chosen
solution of the model. If we would like to examine the ability of our model to provide
one period ahead forecasts of our endogenous variables, we use the static solution of
the model in which values of the endogenous variables up to the previous period are
used each time when the model is solved and lagged endogenous variables are based
on the actual values. To do this, we can look at the predictions of our model against
our historical data, using actual values for both the exogenous and the lagged
endogenous variables of the model. (Novales 2000)
But, when we examine how the model performs when used to produce a multistep forecast, we use the dynamic solution of the model in which we must use our
forecasts from previous periods, not actual historical data. A dynamic solution is the
correct method to use when forecasting many periods in the future or evaluating how
a multi-step forecast would have performed historically.
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Stochastic Simulation: Policy recommendations, for example rules for
monetary policy, are evaluated with models to examine their ability to handle
economic shocks. In order not to depend on one specific historical time series of
shocks, we use stochastic simulations. In this simulation, the equations of the model
are solved with residuals, which match to randomly drawn errors. In doing so, a
distribution of outcomes for endogenous variables in every period is generated and
approximated by solving the model many times using different draws for the random
components and then calculating statistics overall the different outcomes. The
stochastic simulation is typically used to get an idea about the sensitivity of the results
to various shocks. In a stochastic simulation the model is solved n times, each time
using a new set of time series of the shocks. That is, n new time series for each of the
original residuals of the estimated equations. From the results of these n simulations,
we can calculate for each endogenous variable in each time period the average of the
results and also the 90 %or 95% confidence intervals (i.e. the 5% or 2.5% largest and
5% or 2.5% smallest results). When the confidence intervals are small and the time
series averages and standard deviations of endogenous variables do not change very
much between simulations, we may conclude that the results are robust. The difference
between dynamic and static simulation is in the treatment of the lagged values of the
endogenous variables during the simulation. Dynamic simulation uses historical data
for lagged endogenous variables if they are dated prior to the first period of the
simulation. Thereafter it uses the values forecasted by the model itself. Static
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simulation uses actual values for all lagged variables even if they are endogenous to
the model
Policy Simulation: Having satisfied with the performance of our model, we can
use it to forecast the future values of endogenous variables. The first step to do that is
to decide the future values of the exogenous variables that will be used in the period of
forecast. The future values of exogenous variables may be based on our best guess on
what we expect to happen or they may be one particular policy that we are interested
in. In general, we will be interested in constructing several different scenarios (paths)
reflecting some macroeconomic policies and then comparing the results. The future
values of our exogenous variables reflects the influence of: fiscal policy, (Government
expenditure (G) and taxes (T); Monetary policy, domestic credit (DC); Exchange
market policy, Exchange rate (Ex); and external shocks, oil price uncertainty and
world interest rate (S/LROIL and WR). We compare our model predictions under a
variety of different assumptions regarding policy options discussed above.
3- Simulation Under Different Scenarios: The Case of Egypt
We will take the Egyptian economy as a representative case for the Middle
Eastern economy to apply the policy simulation scenarios. In additions to the
researcher’s concern about the Egyptian economy, there are some rationales for the
choice. Egypt is undertaking fast steps toward integrating in the global economy in the
last few years such free trade agreement (FTA) with the USA. In 1999 and Egyptian-
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Europe trade partnership in 2003.Therefore, we want to pursue the different policy
scenarios in response the impact of such measures.
When testing different scenarios in a dynamic framework, the basic principle is
to compare results with what would otherwise have occurred in the economy in the
absence of the scenario. For doing so, the first step is to establish a baseline simulation
(sometimes called reference case), which will form the scenario of what is forecast to
be the changes in the economy from year to year. In the usual baseline simulation we
must provide the forecasts of all exogenous variables in the model and then estimate
the baseline model for the periods of (2004-2010). Specifically, our baseline simulation
includes forecast of government expenditure, credit to private sector, tax rates, US
interest rate, inflation uncertainty, credit uncertainty, short and long run oil price
uncertainty, and exchange rate uncertainty. Thereafter, we select some exogenous
variables that represent the policymaker’s interests, and change them according to the
proposed scenario while holding the other future values constant. The comparison
between the baselines and the scenario shows policy impacts
For generating out-of-sample forecasts, the first step involves selecting a time
period over which each variable is examined. We used monthly data for all uncertainty
measures, domestic credit, and US interest rate to construct monthly forecast and then
we aggregated them to be annual forecasts. The annual data are used for government
expenditure and tax rates. Second step is to construct the stochastic models. BoxJenkins or ARIMA models were employed. By plotting series, non-stationarity was
revealed for some variables. Technically speaking, we found that domestic credit and
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government expenditure have a unit root; therefore a non-stationary time series is
transformed into a stationary time series by differencing as discussed in Chapter II.
Also autocorrelation function (ACF) and partial autocorrelation function (PACF) are
estimated.
The ARIMA model is used for generating forecast value of government
expenditure, domestic credit, taxes and US interest rate. For government expenditure
(G), we found the first difference of In (G) follows AR (2) process. The government
expenditure is projected to grow at 15.7% annually. For domestic credit (DC), the AR
(3) process is identified. The forecast result shows that the domestic credit is expected
to increase at 9.3 % annually. The historical path of tax rate is quiet different, we
cannot follow its rising historical path. Instead, we will assume that the tax rate
remains at its last observed historical value over the entire simulation horizon. Indeed,
the last observed tax rate was the highest level that is 23% in average. Keeping the last
observed tax rate is reasonable assumption for two reasons. First: the government
cannot continue raising the tax rate, which is already very high, without taking into
account the society’s tax capacity and the contractionary effects on the economy.
Second: this assumption is matched with the government policy that aims to encourage
investment and capital flows.
For the US interest rate, we used ARIMA (1, 1,1) to forecast the US interest
rate over the simulation horizon. The results show that the US interest is projected to
increase 4.5% over the first three years of the simulation and then starts declining
during the rest of the simulation horizon expected to rise until 2006. For the
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uncertainty series, we will use the mean value of the uncertainty measures over the
simulation horizon. More specifically, we use the mean value of the uncertainty over
the last ten years of the sample periods, from 1994 to 2003, for long-run oil price
uncertainty, inflation, and domestic credit. For short-run oil price uncertainty and
exchange rate uncertainty we used the recent last five years mean value of the
uncertainty measures. Figure (4-1) shows the future forecasts of the exogenous
variables.
The baseline forecast provides the base case from which other scenarios are
constructed. This forecast assumes that domestic investment policies, capital flows;
governments’ fiscal policies, and monetary policy would remain constant during the
simulation horizon. Also the model assumes that the uncertainty facing the country will
be on its mean. The results of the baseline are shown in figure (4-2). With unchanged
policies, domestic investment growth would average approximately 2.3% per annum,
which is low compared with what would be to achieve the development targets.
Growth in FDI is expected to average 7.1% per annum over the simulation horizon.
Also this expected growth is not high given the low initial level of FDI in the country.
Foreign bank loans are expected to grow at 4.8%. Finally, the foreign portfolio
investment is expected to remain as it is over the simulation horizon. These results are
matched with the World Bank reports that observe and forecast global development.
Indeed, FDI flows to developing countries fell in 2003 for the second consecutive year
as reported in global development finance (World Bank, 2004). More specifically, net
FDI in the Middle East and North Africa fell from $6 billions in 2001 to $2 billions in
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2003. This decline is an observed contrast to the sharp improvement in FPI and FBL.
However, the Egypt’s share of FPI is not expected to increase too much but at least
will be stable. The decline in FDI flows to MENA countries in general and Egypt
specifically is rendered to privatization’s slowdown following financial crises in 2000
and 2001 and the political instability surrounding Middle Eastern countries. Also the
lack of financial infrastructure and developing financial institutions impede the foreign
portfolio investment to inflow.
4- Results
Simulation results are reported in Figures 3 to 10. The first scenario illustrates
the consequences of following contractionary fiscal policy by reducing government
expenditure growth by 5 % of its forecasted level. This policy aims at cooling down
the overheating caused by capital flows, as we mentioned before. The deviations from
the baseline model indicate the policy impacts. In general the impact on both capital
inflows and domestic investment was mixed. Simulation results show that the
contractionary fiscal policy succeeded in curbing FBL and FPI. FPI does not respond
quickly to the contractionary policy. It maintains its original level in 2004, 2005 and
2006 and starts decreasing in 2007 to 2010 by 1.1 % of baseline. FBL decreased by
6.3% on average during the simulation periods. The response of domestic investment
to the government expenditure cut was not too much; it increases by 1.2% against 5%
decrease in government expenditure growth. This suggests a little crowding out effect
of public expenditure. The impact on FDI was positive; it increases by 0.63% of the
baseline. However, the response was delayed for two years, 2004 and 2005.
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In scenario (2) we suppose that the government will pursue an expansionary
fiscal policy. The average tax rate was reduced by 5% compared with the baseline
while other exogenous variable remain unchanged. The results indicated in Figure (44) show that foreign direct investment is more responsive to tax reduction than
domestic investment. This may suggest a discriminatory tax policy to attract FDI. The
impacts on foreign bank loans and foreign portfolio investment are negligible. The
weakness of the response in FBL and FPI reduce the effectiveness of tax reduction on
domestic investment, despite the sizable rise in FDI. The problem with this scenario is
the possibility to raise the price of non-tradable goods and ignite inflation. When we
tried the opposite scenario, raising tax rate, we got an interesting result as in figure (45). FDI increased in both scenarios. Domestic investment decreased but the response
was not symmetric. One explanation for that would be the efficiency of FDI by
readjusting and producing at a lower cost. The asymmetric response of investment is
expected where investment falls more when tax increased while increases less when
tax reduced.
In scenario (4) a contractionary monetary policy is pursued by decreasing
domestic credit growth by 5% of GDP compared with the baseline. The results in
figure (4-6) indicate that the impact of sterilization policy was stronger on both
domestic investment and foreign direct investment than foreign bank loans and foreign
portfolio investment. The results show how foreign direct investment depends on
domestic financial market as a source of finance. Also, the results show the
contractionary impact of sterilization policy on domestic investment. Two explanations
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can be offered to this result. First, one of the tools and the side effects at the same time
of sterilization policy is to raise the discount rate or required reserve ratio which in
turn reduce domestic investment. Second, most of capital flows will be used to
accumulate foreign reserves. Thus a smaller amount will be channeled into domestic
investment. The decline in FBL and FPI in response to sterilization policy is very tiny
and almost reverts to its original path. According to these results we would not
recommend a sterilization policy against capital inflows.
In simulation (5) we expect that the US interest will increase. US interest rates
had reached a trough after continuously declining over a long period. No one
expected them to fall anymore. But why should interest rate be expected to go up?
First, there have been a number of signals that the US Federal Reserve Bank would
raise interest rates. GDP growth in the US economy is high and inflation is rising.
Second, domestic factors including recent data on inflation, GDP and fiscal deficits
have raised expectations of higher rates. The inflation rate has been slowly rising. The
increase in inflation has led to higher inflationary expectations. If it is reasonable to
expect about a 2 per cent real interest in the long run, an increase in the inflation rate
suggests that the nominal interest rates should be higher. The increase in US interest
rates is expected to lead to a withdrawal of funds from all over the world into the US.
Emerging market economies, including Egypt, have seen some indications of this
already in last few months. This is expected to lead to a decline in liquidity and
therefore, a decline in capital inflows. Simulation of the impact of an increase in US
interest rate evokes the question of when and how the interest rate will rise. In our
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simulation periods we expect the interest rate to rise in 2004 and over the seven years
simulation it might return back to the average of its historical value in the period from
1995 to 2000, which is 6.5%. We will assume the Fed will raise the interest rate by
0.75% each year on average.
The simulation results in figure (4-7) show that US interest shock will cause
both domestic investment and capital inflows to decrease. All types of capital inflows
decreased sharply especially FPI, which is mainly driven by changes in world interest
rate. Our results are consistent with the results of other studies, which found that the
global “push” factors have significant impacts on the dynamics of capital inflows in
developing countries (Mody et al 2001). The high sensitivity of capital inflows to US
interest rate may indicate how risky the capital inflows to developing countries are.
Other things being equal, the increase in US interest rate will increase the opportunity
cost for capital to flow to developing countries. This implies that the capital inflows in
Egypt are driven by external factors. A possible explanation for the decrease in the
flows could be the lower level of domestic interest rates. When we modify the scenario
to include a higher domestic interest rate vis-a-vis the increase in US interest rate,
capital flows began to revert to their original values. However, the lower domestic
interest rate can spur domestic economic activity, leading an improvement in credit
rating and hence attract more capital inflows. Unfortunately this possible explanation is
not supported by the data where the domestic interest rate was insignificant.
In scenario (6) we examine the impact of reducing exchange rate uncertainty
by 50% of the mean of conditional standard deviation. As we mentioned in the second
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section, the uncertainty surrounding flexible exchange rate may deter investment and
capital inflows, therefore reducing it should have a positive impact on both capital
flows and domestic investment. Our simulation results in figure (4-8) show that
foreign direct investment is more responsive to the reduction in exchange rate
uncertainty than domestic investment. FDI increased by 0.4 %, on average, (from
1.2% to 1.6%) while domestic investment increased gradually in range from 0.27% to
2.8% in response to 50% reduction in exchange rate uncertainty over the simulation
periods. Not surprisingly, the foreign portfolio investment decreased in response to the
reduction in exchange rate uncertainty. However, the reduction in FPI was tiny and
about 0.2 % of baseline.
In scenario (7) figure (4-9), we assumed that the short run uncertainty of oil
prices can be reduced, by regional arrangement within oil producing countries since
they have some power to stabilize the price. We examine the impact of a 50%
reduction in the mean of conditional standard deviation of oil price on domestic
investment and capital flows. Our simulation results have mixes signals. Domestic
investment decreased in the first three years of simulation by about 0.68 % under the
baseline value and after that it was above the baseline by 1.5% of the baseline. This
implies that the short run oil price uncertainty has a positive effect s on domestic
investment and these effects last for three years and after that the traditional
relationship between uncertainty and investment dominates. This suggests a delay in
policy response to counteract the effects of short run uncertainty. All types of capital
flows increased in response to the reduction in short run oil price uncertainty. A 50%
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decrease in sort run oil price uncertainty caused foreign bank loans to increase by
7.4% of baseline. Foreign direct investment increase by 8.3 % on average but it reverts
to its original path in the end of simulation periods. FPI increased by negligible
amount.
The impact of reducing long run oil price uncertainty on domestic investment
and capital flows is shown in figure (4-10). The results of the simulation were mixed.
Domestic investment and foreign direct investment increased while foreign bank loans
and foreign portfolio investment remain unchanged. One possible explanation for the
increase in domestic investment and FDI in response to the reduction in long run
uncertainty could be the low domestic interest rate associated with the improvement in
macroeconomics aggregates due to the reduction in long run oil price uncertainty.
When we control for the domestic interest rate in this scenario, we got the same
results. This supported the complementary relationship between domestic investment
and FDI. The comparison between scenario 6 and 7 suggests that the oil producing
countries should work to reduce oil price uncertainty in general to attract more capital
inflows. Despite the response of each type of capital inflows is different to the
reduction in oil price uncertainty, policy makers have to be cautious in dealing with
long run oil price uncertainty because its reducing effect on FBL and FPI. Also,
delaying response to short run oil price uncertainty may be a strategic move for
domestic investment because higher short run uncertainty triggers more investment in
the beginning and after that reduces investment.
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5- Conclusion
In this chapter we examined the economic outlook of domestic investment and
capital flows in the Egyptian economy. In general the economic outlook is good but
not enough to help the Egyptian economy to achieve high growth rate given the
anticipated growth in domestic investment and capital flows. The chapter provides
several perceptions. Firstly it focuses on the importance of simulation as the main
guide in adopting strategic economic polices in a small open economy. Secondly the
chapter provides different scenarios for the effects of different policy responses on
capital flows and domestic investment. Out-of-Sample forecasts of factors affecting
the interaction between domestic investment and capital flows are generated over the
periods from 2004 to 2010. Among the policy implication of the chapter are that the
sterilization policy is not recommended for the Egyptian economy. In spite of its role
in cooling down the overheating caused by the capital inflows, it has a contractionary
effect on domestic investment because of increasing interest rate. Also the
accumulated reserves associated with the sterilization policy will allow a smaller
amount of capital flows to be channeled to domestic investment. Second reducing
short run and long run oil prices is favorable and has positive effects on both domestic
investment and capital inflows specially FDI. Finally, our simulation results show that
the contractionary fiscal policy by reducing government spending is the appropriate
policy to curb the undesirable effects of capital inflows.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS
Four issues were addressed in this study. First, we examine the dynamic
interaction between each type of capital flows and domestic investment, given the
specificity of oil producing countries. Second, the impacts of short run and long run
uncertainty on investment and capital flows. Third, how frictions originated in capital
market with uncertainty and irreversible investments affect both domestic investment
and capital flow? Fourth, what are the forecasted paths of investment and capital flows
in the next seven years? And what are the best strategic policy initiatives to mange a
small open economy?
Using GMM-3SLS estimator in a SEM framework, the results show that the
interaction exists at least for foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment and
foreign bank lending are the effective components in capital flows to stimulate
domestic investment in oil producing countries. FDI is the strongest catalyst in capital
flows for domestic investment. The interaction between FDI and domestic investment
is bi-direction, however FDI induces domestic investment more than domestic
investment stimulates FDI. The dynamics shows that the lagged FDI has a stronger
impact on domestic investment than the lagged of domestic investment itself. This
suggests flie importance of the initial level of FDI that the country had. FBL is the
second important component in capital flows stimulating domestic investment but its
impact is much less than FDI.
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Defining uncertainty as the unpredictable volatility, we find the main sources of
macroeconomic uncertainty in oil producing countries are inflation, exchange rate, real
interest rate, credit availability, and oil price. By decomposing uncertainty into short
and long run components using CGARCH, we find that both domestic investment and
all types of capital flows are affected by short run and long run uncertainty of oil
prices. However, the effect of short run uncertainty is much larger than long run.
Domestic investment and capital flows are negatively responded to most of uncertainty
measures and these results matched with the line of previous studies. However, long
run oil price uncertainty has a positive effect on FDI.
While credit market imperfection has significant and negative effect on
domestic investment, financial development has a positive and significant effect on
both domestic investment and capital flows. Uncertainty combined with the capital
market imperfection has a negative effect on domestic investment. The negative effects
exerted by uncertainty dampen the positive effects of financial development and this
may explain why the real interest rate is insignificant. Although these results are based
on more realistic assumptions, uncertainty and imperfect markets, they may underpin
N

the neoclassical theory of investment in which financial factors are ignored.
Out-of-Sample forecasts over the periods from 2004 to 2010 reveals that the
economic outlook of domestic investment and capital flows in the Egyptian economy
is not enough to help the Egyptian economy to achieve the target growth rate. Among
the policy implication of the simulation is that the sterilization policy is not
recommended for the Egyptian economy. In spite of its role in cooling down the
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overheating caused by the capital inflows, it has a contractionary effect on domestic
investment because of increasing interest rate. Also the accumulated reserves
associated with the sterilization policy will allow a smaller amount of capital flows to
be channeled to domestic investment. Second reducing short run and long run oil
prices is favorable and has positive effects on both domestic investment and capital
inflows specially FDI. Finally, our simulation results show that the contractionary
fiscal policy by reducing government spending is the appropriate policy to curb the
undesirable effects of capital inflows.
The role of regional arrangements or establishing economic blocks among oil
producing countries in reducing uncertainty and stimulating capital flows might be
pursued in future research. The results of the study is limited to oil producing
countries, therefore expanding the sample size and including non-oil producing
counties need further investigation.
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Figure 1.1
The Effect of Uncertainty and Capital Market Imperfection on Capital Stock
Cost of
Funds

Ri
Ro

R2
R*

Capital Stock
K*
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Table 2.1
Unit Root Test on Log of Inflation Rate
Elliot Rothenberg and
No-Perron Test_____________ Stock Test (ERS)
Country
Algeria
Egypt
Indonesia
Israel
Iran
Kuwait
Tunisia
Nigeria
Qatar
Saudi-Arabia

k
2
3
5
8
3

MZ«

MZt

MSB

MPT

ERSPt

9.12
- 11.5

1.25
0.25
- 1.87
- 1.94
- 1.98

0.21
0.21
0.174
0.23

8.86
9.34

9.921
9.91

0.22

9.12
5.41
8.58

11.4
7.47
9.35

-

0.94

0.37

17.49

11.24

0.15

0.24
0.27

5.2
9.27

11.21
18.41

0.26
0.23

17.15
5.31

9.07
21.1

-

16.2
14.58
- 12.14

-

-

3
2

-

-

4

-

-

4

2

-

7.55

11.2
6.24
- 13.3
- 15.2

2.34
- 1.82
- 2.31

DFGLS
-2.19
-2.21
-2.8
-2.72
-1.97
-1.27
-2.62
-1.32
-2.08
-2.87

-2.52
Syria
- 1.94
12.31
2
- 9.87
0.21
7.87
UAE
3
-2.71
- 14.3
- 2.61
5.32
14.54
0.25
5
-2.54
Venezuela
- 10.1
- 2.05
4.87
12.24
0.17
5%
2.977
- 17.3
- 2.91
0.168
5.48
5.48
Notes: k is the lag length determined by MAIC. Sample period 1981:1 to 2003:10. MZa and
MZt is the Modified Phillips-Perron test. MSB is the Modified Sargan-Bhargava test. ERS Pt
is die Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock Feasible point optimal test. DFGLS is the augmented
Dickey Fuller test.
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Table 2.2
Unit Root Test on Log of Exchange Rate
Elliot. Rothenbem and

MSB
Country
MZt
MPT
ERS Pt DFGLS
k
MZa
13.06
8.91
-1.49
0.25
0.21
-10.2
Algeria
1
7.14
-2.14
0.22
9.19
-1.54
-1.91
2
Egypt
4.92
0.17
2.5
Indonesia
8
18.3
-2.8
-3.45
-0.14
0.29
8.12
10.14
Israel
1
-8.31
-2.42
-1.44
0.2
4.23
7.75
Iran
-2.25
-2.38
5
-1.94
0.37
10.94
9.04
-2.18
3
-7.95
Kuwait
0.13
4.2
12.31
8
-10.23 -0.25
-2.52
Tunisia
4.51
13.24
-11.54 -2.32
0.15
-2.61
6
Nigeria
-1.94
3.87
11.24
Qatar
-9.87
0.11
-2.47
5
10
-10.24 -1.98
0.12
4.12
12.54
-2.57
Saudi Arabia
0.14
3.14
13.78
12.58
-2.31
-2.68
6
Syria
0.15
3.32
14.54
-2.61
-2.71
U.A.E.
3
14.25
0.14
5.24
12.74
12
19.89
-2.42
-3.12
Venezuela
0.168
5.48
5.48
5%
-17.3
-2.91
-2.977
Notes: k is the lag length determined by MAIC. Sample period 1981:1 to 2003:10. MZa and
MZt is the Modified Phillips-Perron test. MSB is the Modified Sargan-Bhargava test. ERS Pt
is the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock Feasible point optimal test. DFGLS is the augmented
Dickey Fuller test.
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Table 2.3
Unit Root Test on Real Interest Rate
Elliot. Rothenbero and

Ng-Perron Test
MPT
MSB
ERSP, DFGLS
Country
k
MZa
MZt
-1.54
0.11
31.26
10.11
-1.39
1
-10.2
Algeria
1
-17.84 -3.44
0.17
5.14
4.17
-3.13
Egypt
7
-1.84
0.18
7.8
Indonesia
15.8.
8.52
-2.87
2
-3.04
0.17
4.27
Israel
4.21
-3.2
-18.1
-1.94
13.8
11.24
5
-9.85
0.11
-2.47
Iran
-1.87
0.09
6.39
9.25
-1.98
I
-7.95
Kuwait
10.25
1
-2.25
-1.52
0.12
6.12
-1.87
Tunisia
-7.54
-1.98
0.15
7.12
12.32
-2.52
Nigeria
-2.74
Qatar
1
-11.37 -2.47
0.12
28.1
14.21
0.73
13.14
11.14
-2.28
1
-12.15 -1.49
Saudi Arabia
10.25
-1.87
1
-7.54
-1.52
0.12
5.82
Syria
2
-12.35 -2.87
0.14
6.39
9.25
-1.9
U.A.E.
8
-12.13 -2.76
0.14
4.39
10.1
-2.o8
Venezuela
-17.3
-2.91
0.168
5.48
5.48
5%
-2.977
Notes: k is the lag length determined by MAIC. Sample period 1981:1 to 2003:10. MZa and
MZt is the Modified Phillips-Perron test. MSB is the Modified Sargan-Bhargava test. ERS Pt
is the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock Feasible point optimal test. DFGLS is the augmented
Dickey Fuller test
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Table 2.4
Unit Root Test on Log of Domestic Credit
Elliot. Rothenbem

00•

Ne-Perron Test
k
MSB
MPT ERS Pt DFGLS
Country
MZa
MZt
0.91
6.08
-2.19
5
-13.2
-1.51
8.21
Algeria
-14.24 -1.59
1.2
6.37
7.18
7
-2.21
Egypt
6
-16.2
-1.69
0.18
8.2
-2.81
Indonesia
8.2
3
-10.1
-2.14
0.97
9.37
9.41
-1.87
Israel
10.85
7.12
12.31
-2.52
2
-1.98
0.12
Iran
-1.58
8
-13.05
-2.04
0.32
7.75
10.73
Kuwait
-11.5
4.14
14.07
1
-1.04
0.47
2.02
Tunisia
3.87
-2.34
2
-9.25
-1.01
0.13
9.78
Nigeria
Qatar
4
-0.87
0.12
2.14
8.744
-1.87
-11.45 -1.94
11.19
-1.88
9
1.37
8.04
Saudi Arabia
2
-14.8
-2.45
0.14
8.45
9.01
-2.41
Syria
1
-11.35 -1.14
5.24
-2.13
U.A.E.
0.10
5.17
8
-12.13 -2.74
7.32
19.14
-2.81
Venezuela
0.15
-17.3
5.48
5%
-2.91
0.168
5.48
-2.977
Notes: k is the lag length determined by MAIC. Sample period 1981:1 to 2003:10. MZa and
MZt is the Modified Phillips-Perron test. MSB is the Modified Sargan-Bhargava test. ERS Pt
is the Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock Feasible point optimal test. DFGLS is the augmented
Dickey Fuller test
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Table 2.5
Estimated AR and GARCH Models ofLog-difference of Inflation Rate
Country
Algeria

GARCHfo. o') process
KurtAR process_________
<Po
<Pi
<P2
<P3______ ct
at_____ yi
osis
9.6** -0.011 0.17** 4.2* 0 .0 1 * 0.93** 19.2
(4.34) (-0.2) (2.7) ( 1 .8 ) (1.67) (2 0 . 1 )

Skew- Jarqueness Bern
1 .2
52.3

Egypt

0.3 -0.08 0.29** 0.14*
(1.15) (-1.23) (3.7) (1.74)

3.5** 0.31** 0.73**
(2.41) (5.1) (32)

5.2

0.98

Indonesia

0.01 -0.03** 0.029* (1.5) (2.05) (1.91) -

6.47* 0.03* 0.94**
( 1 .8 ) (1.85) (38.2)

18

Iran

0.009* -0.13* 0.13* (1.65) (-1.72) (1.92) -

0.006
(1.4)

. *
( 1 .8 )

0.87**
(30.3)

2.4

Israel

0.91
(0.7)

54.8* 0.41*
(1.79) (1.9)

0.33**
(5.3)

4.1

Kuwait

0.13 0.8** -0.25** (1.11) (7.5) (-2.2) -

(1.3)

0.003*
(1.92)

14.8** 0.03**
(3.8) (11.24)

Tunisia

0.65** (12.2) -

-

0 .1 1

0 12

0.15** 0.45*
(1.7)
(1.9)

0.08 -0 .1 * (1.4) (-1.68) -

0.03* 0 .0 2 *
(1.76) ( 1 .6 6 )

Qatar

0.09 0.03* (0.27) (1.64) -

0.009
(0 .8 )

0.14
(7.8)

0.07
(1 . 1 )

0.05** 0.92**
(2.17) (13.3)

-

Syria

0.03 0.01** 0.05* (1.2) (7.2) (1.8)
-

UAE

0.003 0.02** 0.12** (1.47) (2.3) (7.4)
-

0.08** 0 .0 1 *
(2.3) (1.67)

0.47
0.65

54.4
14.1
46.2

1 1 .2

1.25

23.4

4.8

-0.29

1 2 .8

17.5

2.34

42.6

-

Nigeria

Saudi Arabia 0.01 0.05 0.06*
(1.4) (0.73) (1.83)

-0 . 2 1

42.8

0.95*
(1.67)
-

0.84**
(2 . 1 )

1 2 .8

0.97

9.5

18.2

1.23

28.

14.2

0.87

15

1.23

23.4

Venezuela 0.01 0.37** 0.14** 0.04*
0.01** 0.72** 0 .2 ** 8 . 2
0.89
(1.2) (12.2) (5.4) (1.71) (7.3) (2.5)
(3.4)
T-ratio in parentheses, ** Significant at 5%.(>1.96) * Significant at 10 % (>1.64)

18.2

0 .0 2 ** 0.07**
0.74**
(2 .2 ) (2 .8 )
(1.72)
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27.5

Table 2.6
Estimated AR and GARCH Models ofLog-difference of Exchange Rate
GARCHfu. at Drocess
AR Drocess
Kurt- Skew Jarquew
osis
ness Bera
ai
<P3
9o
Yi
9i
92
0.08 0 .0 1 ** 0.93*
7.8
2 .2
0.009 0.44
39.3
(1.65)
(1.19) (7.5)
( 1 .8 ) (4.2)
0.54 0.23** 0.72** 5.2
0.98
42.8
Egypt
0.008 0.513 -0.16 (35.1)
(1.15) (10.23) (-5.7) (14)
(2 . 1 )
1.7
8 .2
Indonesia 0.03 0.07 0.14 0.54 0.24** 0.28** 0.64** 17.2
(2 .8 )
(32)
( 1 .2 ) ( 1 2 .8 ) (8 .2 ) (3.4) (14)
0 .0 0 1
0.19* 0.64** 12.5
2 .8
Iran
0.006 0.47
25.1
(24.8)
(1.92) (5.8)
(17)
(1 .1 )
1.34
Israel
0 .0 1 1
0.55 -0 . 1 2 -0.24 0.04** 0.23** 0.41** 4.83
42.5
(1.7) (7.2) (-2 .8 ) (*3.3) (3.2) (2.09) (5.9)
1 .2
0.15* 0.83** 5.2
0.32
Kuwait -1.96
0 .2 1
0.173 17.5
(2 0 .1 )
(0.34) (-0 .2 ) (27) ( 1 2 ) (1.7)
0.54
0 .0 2
0 .0 1 *
3.2
34.3
Nigeria
2.19 0.28
(0.14) (4.2)
(1.07) (1.72)
1 1 .2
0.61
0.43
1 1 .2
3.2
Tunisia
0.003 0.17 0.39 42.7
(1.3) ( 1 .2 ) (4.7) ( 1 . 1 ) (0.9)
( 1 .2 )
Qatar
4.3
0 .0 2 *
0.97** 11.3
4.1
0.007 0.58 2 1 .1
(2 0 . 1 )
(134) (-0 .2 )
( 1 2 ) (177)
0.61
5.9
Saudi Arabia 0.031 0.003 0.05
-1 . 2
51.3
( 1 .6 )
(1.54) (0.3) (0.97)
1.3
0.013*
0 .8 6 **
25.1 -10.3
Syria
-0.004
5.7
(-1.34) (25.9)
(0 .2 ) (3.5)
UAE
0.03*
0.41** 9.2
2.2
0.69 1 .0 2
2 2 .1
(0.14) (2 .1 )
(1 1 ) (1.7)
0 .0 1 1
0.173 0 .0 2 ** 0 .0 1 **
0.93** 13.2
3.4
Venezuela . 0 0 2
42.3
(17.9) (7.57)
(1.34) (2 2 ) (2.7) (2 0 .1 )
T-ratio in parentheses, ** Significant at 5%.(>1.96) * Significant at 10 %(>1.64).
Country
Algeria
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Table 2.7
Estimated AR and GARCH Models of Real Interest Rate
KurtAR Drocess
GARCHCd. a) Drocess
t
o
ai
osis
q
>
3
<Po
9i
<P2
Yi
0.19 -0.12** 0.008** 0 .0 1 ** 0.93** 7.4
(1.25) (-2.3) (19.7) (7.5)
(26)
0.23 -0.09 0.14** 4.6
Egypt
0.54** 0.33** (1.2) (-1.36) (2.5) (7.2)
(2.4)
3.7
Indonesia
0.9* 0.36** 0.17* 0.13 0.012* 0.94**
(
1
.
8
)
(1.97)
(1.7) (5.2)
(1.7) (4.5)
m
0.027 -0.04**
28.2
Iran
0 .0 1 ** 0 . 1 2 **
(1.94) (1.98) (1.1) (-17.3)
-0.14 0.39** 0.004 0.23** 0.4**
4.2
Israel
(-1.4) (5.4)
(3.2) (2.06) (5.5)
Kuwait
0.51 0.25*
1.2
0.15** 0.82**
5.8
(1.17) ( 1.7)
(0.69) (4.1)
25.9)
0 .0 2 *
5.4
0.12*
12.5
Tunisia
(1.85) (3.5) (1.74)
0.15 0.42** 0.31** 0.14* 1.2
0.15** 0 .6 8 **
31.2
Nigeria
(0 .8 ) (2 .8 ) (31) (1.7) (27.2) (2.9) (31)
18.1
Qatar
0.12* 0.03**0.12** 0.005 0.34* 0.61**
(1.85) (3.2) (5.4)
(12.5) (1.89) (2.3)
1.54 0.001* 27.4
Saudi Arabia 0.012 (1.41) (0.2) (1.64)
0.3 1 0.15** 0.08** 14.5
Syria
0.02 0.15** 0.84**
(0.12) (2.5)
(2 . 1 )
(12.4) (2.12) (3.2)
UAE
0.001 0.24** 0.17 0 . 1 1 *
1.31 0.34** 0.59**
10.25
(1.05) (5.8) (2 . 1 ) (1.79)
(7.9) (3.8) (2.5)
28.1
Venezuela 0.02 0.54** 0.3** 0.17* 0.001 0.64** 0.28**
(0.28) (12.4) i(2 .8 ) (1.64) (12.8) (3.4)
(2 .1 )
T-ratio in parentheses, ** Significant at 5%.(>1.96) * Significant at 10 % (>1.64)
Country
Algeria

1

Skew Jarqueness Bera
-0.64 14.81
-0.52

43.8

-0.38

19.6

-4.5

57.9

-0.42

51.2

0.52

77.2

-0.28

39.2

1.84

42.8

-0.47 29.9
-1.98

38.7

1.04 28.3
1.87
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27.4

-0.98 37.8

Table 2.8
Estimated AR and GARCH Models of Log-difference of Credit
Country

AR Drocess
<Po
<Pl
0 011

Egypt

0.015
(1 .1 )
0 .0 2

(1.3)
Iran

<P3

. ** 0 .4 .4 ** 0.55**
(6 .2 )
(2.1) (4.5)

-0 . 1 1
0.06** _
(-1.03) (1.97) . **
(3.8)

0 12

GARCHCd. al orocess
uj
ai
Yi

Kurtosis

Skew Jarque
ness Ben

1.98** <).34** 0.91** 19.1
(1.9) (2.3)
(5.3)

. * -0.15** -0.17** (1.91) (-2 . 1 2 ) (-3.9) -

Algeria

Indonesia

<i>2

2 2

7.8

0.25** 28.2
0 . 1 1 * 0.09** 1.8** t1.74**
(2.5)
(18) (2 . 1 ) (4.2) (8.7)

0.013 -0.44**
(1.4) (-5.13)

0.007 0 .2 **
(0.93) (2.4)

•

-

-

. **
(7.4)

0 8

1 0 .2

0.75

22.4

1 .2

27.8

2 .8

54.5

0.97

24.2

Israel

0.016
(1 .1 )

0.13 0.09** 0.25* 2.9** 0.37** 0 .6 **
(1.25) (1.96) (1.7) (2 1 ) (3.8) ( 1 0 .6 )

4.2

0.41

25.2

Kuwait

0.008 -0 . 0 2 0.05 -0.06
3.7** 0.15** 0.72**
(2 . 1 ) (-0 .2 1 ) (0.62) (-2.8) (2.4) (4.7) (10.4)

3.8

1.4

41.4

12.5

-0.57

38.5

Tunisia
Nigeria
Qatar

. *
(1.77)

0 021

.

_

-

-

UAE

-

. * -0 .2 1 ** -0 .2 **
( 1 .8 ) (-3.4) (-2.9)

_

0 0 1

-0.09 -0.4**
(-1.4) (-4.8)

. *
( 1 .8 8 )

0 02

-

-0.42**
(1.24) (-5.5) -

0 .0 1

_

_

-

Saudi Arabia 0.05 0.25**
(1.37) (1.98)
Syria

_

-

_

_

-

-

_

.

-

-

0.03** 0.11** (21.9) (2.6) -

0.32* 0.67** 24.8
(1.19) (1.9) (2 .2 )

0 .0 0 2

0.3** 0.16* 0.64**
(3.1) (1.87) (5.4)
88
0.07** 0.9**
(1.37) (2 .8 ) (13.1)
0 .0 0 2
0.44** 0.57**
(1.3) (6.1) (9.3)

1.25

57.9

1 0 .8

1.74

28.2

15.8

-0.84

47.5

34.2

2.97

59.5

•0.94

14.3

0.007* 0.22** 0.79** 6.3
(1.93) (6.4) (17.6)

Venezuela 0.004* i0.21** 0.15** 0.08*
0.03 0.52** 0.34** 15.4
(1.84) (9.3) (5.32) (1.8)
(0 .8 ) (3.8) (6.5)
T-ratio in parentheses, ** Significant at 5%.(>1.96) * Significant at 10 %(>1.64)

1.64 21.4
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Table 2.9
The Component GARCH Model of Oil Price
Data set
a

Permanent Component
P
<P

Transitory Component
A
Y

Kuwait Invasion Augustl990
Oil prices 1974:1-2001:8
(including the invasion)

0.044
(1.57)

0.9981**
(67.5)

0.107**
(2.92)

0.351**
(3.09)

0.551**
(8.78)

Oil prices 1974:1-1990:7
(excluding the invasion)

0.094
(0.259)

0.9830**
(80.4)

0.061**
(2.69)

0.259**
(7.93)

0.522*
(1.92)

September 11,2001
Oil prices 1974:1-2003:3
(Including Sept 11 and excluding
Iraqi war)

0.052
(.37)

0.9976**
(28.2)

0.019**
(2.14)

0.3169**
(4.11)

0.516**
(10.12)

Oil prices 1974:1-2001:8
(Excluding Sept 11)

0.044
(1.57)

0.9981**
(67.5)

0.107**
(2.92)

0.351**
(3.09)

0.551**
(8.78)

Iraqi war April 2003
Oil prices 1974:1-2003:10
(Including Iraqi War)

0.0581
(0.361)

0.9987**
(27.96)

0.035**
(2.46)

0.130**
(3.63)

0.55**
(12.75)

Oil prices 1974:1-2003:3
(Excluding Iraqi War)

0.052
(.372)

0.9976**
(28.2)

0.019**
(2.14)

0.3169**
(4.11)

0.516**
(10.12)

T-ratio in parentheses. ** Significant at 5 %.(> 1.96) * Significant at 10 % (>1.64)
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Figure 2.1
Conditional Standard Deviation of Inflation Rate
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Figure 2.2
Conditional Standard Deviations of Exchange Rate
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Figure 2.3
Conditional Standard Deviation of Real Interest Rate
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Figure 2.4
Conditional Standard Deviation of Credit
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Figure 2.5
Conditional Standard Deviations for Oil Price
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2000

Table 3.1
Interactions Between Domestic Investment and Capital Inflows (System o f GMM3SLS) Domestic Investment and Capital Flows as a Share
of GDP-Annual Data 1981-2003)
I

FDI
-0.008*
(-1.91)

FBL
-0 . 0 0 1
(-0.17)

Lagged Domestic Investment, I(-l)

0.576***
(3.1)

--------

--------

Foreign direct Investment, FDI

0.5***
(3.5)

Domestic investment, I

Lagged Foreign direct Investment, FDI

. ***
(3.8)
0 88

FPI
-0.004
(-0.31)

------0.58***
(13.3)

-------

-------------

Foreign Bank Loans, FBL

0.13*
(2.73)

-------

Lagged Foreign Bank Loans, FBL

0.27***
(3.2)

0.78***
(17.7)

Foreign Portfolio Investment, FPI

0.24***
( 1 .2 )

--------

-------

-------

Lagged Foreign Portfolio Investment,
FPI

0.25**(1.98)

--------

-------

0.13***
(22.9)

GDP Growth, GGDP

10.4**
(2.9)

1 .8 6 ***
(5.4)

2.4***
(2 .2 )

2.82
(1.04)

5.8**
(1.96)

2 2

Lagged GDP Growth, GGDP(-l)

. ***
(5.1)

4.7***
(3.5)

14.3***
(5.8)

0.042***
(2.9)

-------

0 011

Domestic Credit, DC

. **
(-2.9)

0.003
(1.24)

-------

------

Real Interest Rate (RR)

-0 . 0 2
(-1 .2 )
-0.14*
(-1.84)

---------

-------

------

Relative Price of Capital (RPK)

0.09***
(2 .1 )

0.003
(0.7)

-------

------

Government Expenditure, G

-0 . 0 0 1
(-0.27)

-------

------

_0

Taxes, T

19***
......
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Table 3.1 - Continued
I

FDI

FBL
-0.05***
(-2 .2 )

World Interest Rate, WI

FPI
. **
(2.48)

0 2

Exchange Rate Uncertainly, EXU

-0.19*
(-1.94)

-0 .0 0 2 *
(-1.94)

-0.43
(-1.42)

-0.39
(-1.37)

Inflation Uncertainty, INFU

-3.3***
(-4.6)

-.53***
(-4.7)

-2 . 1
(-1.26)

-6.3*
(-1.84)

Real Interest Rate Uncertainty, RRU

-6 .8 ***
(-3.8)

-0.27
(-1 .2 )

-2 . 2
(-0.27)

0.31
(0.9)

Credit Uncertainty, CU

-0.09***
(-6.3)

-0 . 0 2
(-1 ,0 1 )

-0.05***
(-2 .2 )

0.014
(1.5)

Short Run oil price Uncertainty,
SROILU

-84.1***
(-3.3)

-20.4***
(-3.6)

. ***
(2.03)

-27***
(-3.7)

Long Run oil price Uncertainty,
LROILU

-34.3*
(-1.96)

15.9***
(2 .6 )

-18.9***
(-3.6)

-17***
Id)

0 8

Notes: t-ratios (in brackets) are heteroskedasticity consistent. One (*), two (**), and three (***)
stars denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively
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Figure 3.1
Model Evaluation Using Static Deterministic Simulation: Domestic Investment
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a

Figure 3.2
Model Evaluation Using Static Deterministic Simulation: Foreign Direct Investment
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Figure 3.3
Model Evaluation Using Static Deterministic Simulation: Foreign Bank Loans
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Figure 3.4
Model Evaluation Using Static Deterministic Simulation: Foreign Portfolio Investment
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- FPIJLWf (Poaalm ) |

Figure 4.1
Out-of-Sample Forecast of Exogenous Variables
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INFTl

Figure 4.2
The Baseline Forecast of Endogenous Variables
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Figure 4.3
Scenario 1: Reducing Government Expenditure Growth by 5%
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Figure 4.4
Scenario 2: Reducing Average Tax Rate by 5%
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Figure 4.5
Scenario 3: Increasing Tax Rate by 5%
FDI ± 2 S.E.

FBL±2 S.E.
4.0
3.53.02.52.0
1.5
1.0

0.5

FBL (Scenario 2 M ean )

FDI (Scenario 2 M ean )

FBL (Baseline Mean)

FPI ±2 S.E.

FDI (Baseline Mean)

I±2 S.E.
100
90
8070-

FPI (Scenario 2 M ean )

FPI (Baseline Mean)

1 (Scenario 2 M ean )

1 (Baseline Mean)

151

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 4.6
Scenario 4: Reducing Domestic Credit Growth by 5%
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Figure 4,7
Scenario 5: Increasing World Interest Rate to Its Historical Mean Value 8%
FBL ± 2 S.E.

FDI ± 2 S.E.

3.6
3.2
2 .8 -

2.4
2.0
1.6 .
1. 2 0.8
FBL (Scenario 1 M ean )

— FDI (Scenario 1 M ea n )

FBL (Baseline Mean)

FDI (Baseline Mean)

I ± 2 S.E.

FPI ± 2 S.E.
807570
-

65-

2-

60

-6

55-

FPI (Scenario 1 M ean )

FPI (Baseline Mean)

I (Scenario 1 M ea n )

1 (Baseline Mean)

153

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 4.8
Scenario 6: Reducing Exchange Rate Uncertainty by 50% of the Mean of CSD
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Figure 4.9
Scenario 7: Reducing Short-Run Oil Prices by 50% o f the Mean of CSD
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10

Figure 4.10
Scenario 8: Reducing Long-Run Oil Price Uncertainty by 50% of the Mean of CSD
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